






Bankruptcy and Intellectual Property  
in the  











This  thesis  reflects  the  draft  version  of  the  proposed  Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China as of 30 January 
2006.  A  revised  version  of  the  law  was  subsequently  enacted  on 
27 August  2006,  and  will  be  effective  1 June 2007.  An  English 
translation of the enacted law is available through the Internet site of the 







This thesis examines the new system of bankruptcy law in the People’s 
Republic of China.  
A major issue of the thesis is the analysis of the possible links and side 
effects of the upcoming bankruptcy law on intellectual property rights in 
China. 
The  fact  that  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  is  one  of  the  fastest 
growing  economies  with  the  intention  of  becoming  accepted  as  a 
market economy has various influences upon the political decisions and 
legal developments in China and the rest of the world.  
All changes of the legal environment in China aim at increasing the faith 
of foreign investors and the growth of foreign investment in China.  
China  continuously  allows  foreigners  to  invest  in  more  and  more 
business  areas  and  there  is  a  wide  variety  of  different  types  of 
investment in China.  
On the one hand, companies have the possibility to invest their capital. 
On the other hand, companies have the option to invest their technical 
knowledge.  Technical  knowledge  is  of  particular  interest  to  Chinese 
partners.  Because  of  this  strong  interest,  western  companies  are  in 
great danger of losing their intellectual property.  
 
The  Chinese  legal  system  meanwhile  offers  western  companies  a 
range of different corporate forms. The corporate forms “Wholly Foreign 
Owned Enterprise” and “joint venture” in particular are very attractive to II 
foreign investors. Due to the large variety of corporate forms, this thesis 
focuses on the involvement of foreign investors in a joint venture.  
Usually, western companies choose to invest intellectual property in the 
form of a “joint venture”. This generates a special need for the foreign 
company to receive a guarantee for their property. Foreign companies 
fear that a third party might use their intellectual property and, in order 
to reduce this risk, they have to be very careful as to how they invest 
their intellectual property in China.  
The  new  bankruptcy  law  can  create  a  new  form  of  this  well-known 
threat  to  foreign  companies  who  invest  in  the  People’s  Republic  of 
China. The aim of this thesis is to identify some of these new risks and 
to attempt to find solutions to help foreign investors reduce potential 
risks for their investments.  
Globalisation and international investors are currently focusing on the 
Chinese market. In order to understand the contemporary situation in 
China, it is important to understand Chinese history and culture. Taking 
this  into  account,  this  thesis  summarises  the  historical  and  cultural 
aspects in the initial chapters. 
 III 
 
Table of contents 
A  Introduction ........................................................................................1 
1.  Chinese Legal Philosophy..................................................................3 
2.  Company Forms of the People’s Republic of China.........................13 
2.1.  State-Owned Enterprises..........................................................14 
2.2.  Foreign Investment Enterprises................................................17 
2.3.  Joint Ventures...........................................................................18 
2.4.  Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises ..........................................19 
3.  Restrictions for Foreign Investment..................................................20 
4.  Restrictions as a Result of Company Laws and Regulations...........22 
B  Development of Bankruptcy Laws and Regulation in China.............25 
1.  The Historical Changes in Chinese Bankruptcy Laws......................25 
2.  Statistics of Cases of Bankruptcy in the People’s Republic  
of China............................................................................................32 
3.  Examples .........................................................................................39 
3.1.  The Zhongjiang Silk Company Case.........................................39 
3.2.  The Guangdong International Trust and Investment  
Company Case ........................................................................42 
4.  The Economic Effects of the Current Chinese Bankruptcy Laws .....47 
C  The new Bankruptcy Law of China...................................................51 
1.  Reconstruction .................................................................................60 
2.  The Different Causes of Bankruptcy.................................................64 
3.  Management ....................................................................................67 
4.  The Creditors’ Meeting.....................................................................73 
5.  Cross-border Insolvencies................................................................75 IV 
6.  Termination of Contracts..................................................................79 
D  Intellectual Property and Bankruptcy Law........................................80 
1.  Transfer of Intellectual Property Rights ............................................86 
2.  The Effects of Bankruptcy Laws on Intellectual Property Rights ......95 
3.  Practical Appearance.....................................................................101 
E  Summary........................................................................................105 
1.  The Situation in China....................................................................105 
2.  A Modern Chinese Bankruptcy Law...............................................106 
3.  Chinese Bankruptcy Statistics........................................................108 
4.  Government Influence....................................................................109 
5.  Fraudulent Bankruptcy...................................................................111 
6.  Creditor Orientation........................................................................113 
7.  Reconstruction ...............................................................................114 
8.  Intellectual property rights ..............................................................116 
F  Conclusion .....................................................................................119 
G  Bibliography ...................................................................................123 
 1 
 
A  Introduction 
 
In the current world economic situation, China seems to be one of the 
few  countries  whose  economy  is  booming.
1  As  a  result,  many 
international companies are willing to invest financial and technological 
values in China. These international companies are allowed to invest in 
most of the different economic areas and the investment of intellectual 
property  is  quite  popular.  China  is  of  great  interest  to  the  investing 
companies  as  human  labour  in  China  is  currently  cheap.  These 
companies are looking to exploit this.  
The idea that a booming economy like the Chinese one might be facing 
negative  growth  and  that  ultimately  companies  may  have  to  file  for 
insolvency  or  bankruptcy  is  not  very  popular.
2  Neither  politicians  nor 
businessmen like these “negative” views and tend to refer to those who 
breach the subject as “alarmists”. If, finally, a collapse occurs, it is most 
likely that everybody will point at these “alarmists” and accuse them of 
provoking  the  downfall  by  creating  a  “negative”  climate.  This  is 
happening  although  bankruptcies  and  insolvencies  are  part  of  the 
normal  economic  life  in  every  market  economy.  As  in  many  other 
countries, the topic of negative economic growth is very unpopular in 
China. This attitude is probably related to the reservations concerning 
                                                 
1 Gärtner, M, "Zwischen Turbo-Kapitalismus und Planwirtschaft - Die Schwächen des 
Standorts liegen vor allem in der Machtfülle des Staates" (2004) <http://www.nrw-
export.de/export/2113.asp> (07 April 2005).  
2 Gärtner, M, "Zwischen Turbo-Kapitalismus und Planwirtschaft - Die Schwächen des 
Standorts liegen vor allem in der Machtfülle des Staates" (2004) <http://www.nrw-
export.de/export/2113.asp> (07 April 2005) 2 
the  latest  economic  changes  in  the  country  and  the  “new”  idea  that 
companies which are not performing well have to be removed from the 
market.  
 
In Chinese newspapers, the development of the new bankruptcy law is 
widely criticised. Besides these newspapers, it is quite difficult to find 
relevant  information  on  the  drafting  of  the  new  bankruptcy  law.  This 
may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  legislation  process  for  the  new 
bankruptcy  law  is  in  its  final  stage  but  not  yet  complete.  Several 
institutions have been assisting the Chinese lawmakers to develop and 
evaluate  the  different  drafts  of  the  new  law.  These  institutions  have 
refused  to  provide  the  author  with  any  current  information.  This 
reservation is based upon the fact that the Chinese did not authorise 
any  publication  beforehand.  In  addition  to  this  barrier,  Chinese 
authorities do not seem interested in providing information. The author 
has  sent  several  requests  to  Chinese  ministries  to  gain  access  to 
current information, laws, regulations and catalogues related to laws or 
regulations.  These  requests  either  remained  unanswered  until  the 
submission date or, if answered, the response was incomplete. In the 
context of this thesis, the information policy of the People’s Republic of 
China  caused  some  difficulties.  English  versions  of  Chinese 
newspapers are sometimes the most recent source of information that 
is  provided  by  mainland  China.  Some  academic  articles  or  papers 
related to the topic of bankruptcy have been released which discuss the 
2002  draft  of  the  new  bankruptcy  law.  The  2002  draft  is  the  latest 
version that seems to have been published. The fact that no current 3 
academic information on the bankruptcy law is available makes it quite 
difficult to evaluate the latest and most recent steps in the development 
of that law.  
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  alert  international  investors  to  problems 
which could be caused by the new bankruptcy law. The focus of this 
thesis will fall upon the effects the new bankruptcy law could have on 
the intellectual property rights. This thesis is extremely challenging as 
there is very little academic literature dealing with the topics of Chinese 
bankruptcy  law  and  intellectual  property.  In  the  end,  it  is  useful  to 
approach  some  of  the  legal  issues  from  an  economic  point  of  view, 
which is appropriate to point out a link between the two different legal 
areas. In order to understand the Chinese approach to legal questions, 
it is necessary to provide a short overview of Chinese legal philosophy 
and its connection to the legislative process.  
 
1.  Chinese Legal Philosophy  
 
The Chinese legal philosophy is very difficult to understand for western-
educated  individuals.  Although  Chinese  philosophy  seems  difficult  to 
comprehend,  the  importance  of  understanding  this  philosophy  is 
indisputable for doing business in China. Confucius is one of the most 
famous  and  well-known  Chinese  philosophers  and  he  started  a 
philosophical approach to legal issues. 
In the early stages of Chinese legal theory, two different theories are 
apparent.  4 
The first source of legal development is “fazhi”. “Fazhi” is traditionally 
translated as “law” and approaches the legal issue from the legal order.
3  
The second source of legal development is “lizhi”. “Lizhi” approaches 
the legal issue from the rites or rituals.
4 The “lizhi” is often described as 
a kind of natural law.
5  
Confucius based his philosophy on the “li” and described order as a 
policy  of  harmony  that  requires  the  voluntary  participation  of  the 
individuals who collectively comprise a society. According to his ideas, 
the ability to resolve a conflict relies on the willingness of each person 
involved to reach a mutual solution.
6 In Confucian philosophy, a ruler 
had  to  bring  harmony  to  the  arguing  parties.  Consequently,  this 
Confucian system was extremely personalised.  
The legalists based their system of law on the “fazhi”. This means they 
tried to establish codified laws. The advantage of codified laws is the 
objective and simple way in which the rules can be understood. A legal 
system like this made it easy to establish and maintain political control 
and social order. The idea of codified public laws was very simple and 
clear.  Everybody  was  aware  of  the  published  laws  and  the 
consequences of violating them.
7  
                                                 
3 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 29 ff. 
4 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 29 f. 
5 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 31. 
6 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 30;  
Wong, B K Y, "Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution" (2000) 30 
Hong Kong Law Journal 304, 307 Electronic Westlaw (29 June 2005). 
7 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 33 f.;  
Wong, B K Y, "Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution" (2000) 30 
Hong Kong Law Journal 304, 311 Electronic Westlaw (29 June 2005). 5 
In China, both systems existed in parallel. In the Han period, the power 
of the rulers of Confucian ideology was limited. The idea of the Huang-
Lao  school  was  to  reduce  the  power  of  the  Confucian  rulers.  The 
intention of Huang-Lao was that the “rulers” should only interpret the 
laws as opposed to creating them. This means the written laws set up 
standards that had to be used by the “rulers” to solve the problems of 
disputing  parties.  Huang-Lao´s  idea  was  to  have  judges  who  only 
decided what was right or wrong on the basis of codified laws.
8  
During the Chinese Imperial Era, the legal system was well-developed 
and detailed regulations were established to organise the legal system. 
The laws basically remained the same and their implementation was 
supported  by  official  commentaries.  Nevertheless,  the  imperial  legal 
system was still under the influence of the legalists and the Confucian 
philosophy.
9 The content of the laws generally continued although the 
dynasties changed. Usually the change of a dynasty led to a change in 
the  names  or  the  characters  of  the  laws.  In  the  early  stages  of  the 
imperial  system,  the  magistrates  had  a  strong,  classic,  Confucian 
influence.  In  the  later  dynasties,  they  were  trained  in  the  laws  and 
supported by clerks who had studied the law.
10 Although there was a 
well-developed  legal  system,  it  mostly  covered  criminal  law. 
                                                 
8 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 34 f. 
9 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 38. 
10 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 36 f.;  
Wong, B K Y, "Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution" (2000) 30 
Hong Kong Law Journal 304, 316 Electronic Westlaw (29 June 2005);  
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.04.  6 
Commercial and civil cases were still solved in a more informal fashion. 
In  the  end,  the  imperial  system  did  not  achieve  the  reduction  of the 
rulers influence and the “lizhi” and “fazhi” traditions remained until the 
end of the dynasty system.
11  
As a result of the inability of the Quing dynasty to protect China against 
Great Britain and Japan, several different political and legal changes 
were  recommended  by  radical  groups.  Some  of  these  groups  were 
influenced  by  western  ideas  and  some  remained  in  the  tradition  of 
Confucius. In the era of the Chinese Republic, China adopted the legal 
code systems from Germany and Japan. These changes were carried 
out in the early 1900s. However, these changes had little impact on the 
Chinese attitude towards the laws due to the fact that the Republic did 
not last very long.
12 
The  Chinese  Republic  was  ended  by  the  Communist  Revolution. 
Communist  ideology  and  thoughts  became  relevant  to  everything  in 
public  life. The  attitude  towards  the bourgeois  laws  in  particular was 
quite  clear.  The  ideal  communist  society  does  not  need  laws 
established by the overthrown political system which only protect the 
privileged positions. The legal system under Mao varied according to 
the various periods of the Mao era. Effectively, this means that there 
were only a few written laws and the laws could be altered at any time 
to suit the attitude of the Communist Party leaders. In most cases, the 
                                                 
11 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 41. 
12 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 43;  
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.07.  7 
idea was that the laws should serve the proletariat.
13 This could only be 
achieved if the laws the Communists established were simple and easy 
to understand for everybody in the country. The ideology of Marxism-
Leninism  and  the  ideology  of  Confucius  had  different  approaches 
towards the understanding of legal issues but both ideas lead to similar 
solutions. One example of how both ideologies converge is the issue 
related  to  intellectual  property.
14  This  could  lead  to  the  idea  that  the 
influence of traditional Chinese culture on the legal system continued 
after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China.
15 During the Mao 
era, the legal system and the legislative process had its ups und downs. 
The Cultural Revolution terminated the attempt to introduce legal reform 
of the 1960s. The Chinese Communist Party influenced specific legal 
cases which were of any interest to the political leaders. Eventually, the 
written law was effectively futile because the Party cadres interpreted 
the laws in favour of the Communist Party.
16  
The Cultural Revolution caused serious damage to Chinese legislative 
development and, in the follow-up to the Mao era, this problem became 
quite  apparent.
17  The  open-door  policy  of  the  1970s  needed  legal 
                                                 
13 Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.08 f. 
14 Alford, W P, To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in 
Chinese Civilization (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1995) Page 57.  
15 Wong, B K Y, "Traditional Chinese Philosophy and Dispute Resolution" (2000) 30 
Hong Kong Law Journal 304, 306 Electronic Westlaw (29 June 2005).  
16 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 43 ff;  
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.09. 
17 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 49;  
 8 
modification  or,  better  still,  total  modernisation.  In  the  debate  over 
creating a legal system for China, some scholars introduced a shift in 
rhetoric.  The  expression  “fazhi”  could  be  written  in  different  Chinese 
characters and carry a different meaning. One of the meanings could be 
the  “Socialist  Rule  of  Law”.  This  particular  interpretation  became 
popular again in that period.
18 Several modernisations were carried out 
in  the  late  1970s  and  1980s.  These  modernisations  created  a  legal 
system that, in the end, was dominated by the idea of a government of 
law and not man.
19  
An escalation of the domestic political situation in China was the reason 
why the changes to the legislation stalled. The Tiananmen incident in 
1989  was  the  reason  the  Chinese  authorities  suspended  any  further 
legal reforms. The reluctance of the Communist leaders towards further 
legal  reforms  lasted  until  1992.  That  year  marked  the  greater 
independence  of  the  legal  profession  and  the  launch  of  different 
experiments in the economic field. Laws were passed and introduced 
which especially ruled lawyers and judges or other arms of the legal 
system.
20  
Under the current situation of constitutional laws, the Communist Party 
still  has  a  considerable  influence  over,  for  example,  the  National 
                                                 
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.08 f. 
18 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 63;  
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.12. 
19 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 56 ff. 
20 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 58. 9 
People’s  Congress,  courts,  and  governmental  organs.  Consequently, 
the  party  ideology  can  still  be  implemented  throughout  the  various 
governmental levels.
21  
Although the Chinese constitution states that the Chinese courts shall 
be independent of any influence from the government or governmental 
organisations,  there  is  always  a  possibility  to  influence  the  courts 
today.
22 Local authorities in particular have the potential to influence the 
courts.  This  influence  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  the  courts  are 
financed by  the  local government.  Consequently,  the  strong financial 
dependence of the local courts on the local governments is one of the 
potential opportunities for the authorities to exert their influence.
23  
In  addition,  the  organs  of  the  Communist  Party  have  different 
possibilities  to  manipulate  the  legal  system.  There  are  a  variety  of 
alternatives for the Communist Party to influence the courts in general, 
and the Party has the ability to influence the court’s decision directly in 
specific cases. These manipulations could, on the one hand, be carried 
out from outside the legal system by the Party committee, the Politico-
                                                 
21 Halliday, T C & Carruthers, B G, “How (Not) to Implement Effective Insolvency Risk 
Management Systems: Lessons From Asia - and Elsewhere” Insolvency Systems and 
Risk Management in Asia; Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform 2004, New Delhi, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Page 8 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,2340,en_2649_201185_33928916_1_1_1_1,00.
html> (27 July 2005);  
Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 189. 
22 Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.19. 
23 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 280 f.;  
Wu, W, „Commencement of Bankruptcy Proceedings in China: Key Issues in the 
Proposed New Enterprise Bankruptcy and Reorganisation Law“ (2004) 35 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 239, 242 Electronic LexisNexis (03 April 2005); 
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.19. 10 
Legal  Committee  and  the  Organisation  Departments.  On  the  other 
hand, manipulations could be carried out internally by the Party Group, 
Party  Institutional  Organ,  Party  cells,  Political  Departments  or  by  the 
adjudicative department within the legislation system.
24  
One  of  the  possibilities  the  Party  has  to  influence  the  judge  is,  for 
example, its ability to exert moral pressure on the judge by reminding 
him  to  follow  socialist  ideology.
  25  Socialist  ideology  in  China  is 
established by the Communist Party and is still dominant in Chinese 
society. This means that if the Party supports an idea, there is a lot of 
pressure on the judge to follow the idea of the Communist Party. For 
Chinese  people,  social  standing  is  very  important.
26  The  Chinese 
characters  for  “guanxi”  (or  the  personal  network)  and  “renquing”  (or 
human  feelings  or  empathy)  describe  a  social  understanding  that 
should not be underestimated. As social standing in Chinese society is 
very important, a judge might be forced into a situation where he is in 
danger  of  losing  his  “guanxi”.  Due  to  the  risk  of  losing  his  social 
position,  a  judge  might  rule  in  favour  of  the  social  ideology  of  the 
Communist Party instead of adhering to the written laws.
27  
                                                 
24 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 302; 
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.19. 
25 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 302. 
26 Wilson, J & Brennan R, "Market Entry Methods for Western Firms in China" (2003) 
15: 4 Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics 3, 8 f. Electronic Proquest (27 
June 2005) 
27 Halverson, K, “China's WTO Accession: Economic, Legal, and Political Implications" 
(2004) 27 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 319, 358 
Electronic LexisNexis (04 April 2005);  
Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 315 f. 11 
Another possibility to influence the judges is based on the power of the 
Communist Party to influence personal matters of the courts
28, namely 
the ability of the Communist Party to influence a judge’s career.
29 For 
the judges, it is very clear that there is little chance of furthering their 
career, if their decisions do not comply with the Communist Party.  
Probably  another  less  obvious  but  effective  technique  in  the 
manipulation  of  the  legal  system  is  the  influence  on  the  legislation 
process.  The  political  leaders  have  the  possibility  to  influence  the 
legislative process and have the ability to limit the changes to an extent 
that is appropriate for them. Their influence on the legal system and the 
courts is effectively a question of power. In China, the most powerful 
organisation is the Communist Party. As long as the Communist Party 
does not give away the power, the changing ideology or philosophy of 
the Communist Party will be the governing factor in the development of 
Chinese legislation.
30 It is easy to assume that the Communist Party will 
not allow the legal system to become fully independent as long as the 
political  leaders  can  see  disadvantages  in  the  idea  of  having  a  fully 
independent legal system. As a result, a reduction in the influence of 
the Communist Party is not foreseeable for the near future. Even if the 
central authorities thought that a change were advantageous, the local 
                                                 
28 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 302. 
29 Li, S, „Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years.“ (2001) 5:1 
Harvard Asia Quarterly 
<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200101/0101a006.htm> (17 April 2005);  
Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 305; 
Wang C, “Introduction: An Emerging Legal System” in Wang C and Zhang, X (ed) 
Introduction to Chinese Law, Hong Kong, Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), 
1.17. 
30 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 217 f. 12 
authorities  would  lose  their  influence  and  hamper  these 
improvements.
31  In  fact,  the  influence  of  local  governments  on  the 
courts is described as the most common form of external influence on 
the courts. The government officials are able to exert pressure on the 
courts  in  order  to  generate  a  judgement  that  favours  the  local 
administration.
32  Currently,  the  central  government  is  introducing 
changes  to  reduce  the  power  of  local  authorities  over  the  courts.
33 
Therefore,  it  is  highly  likely  that  the  legal  system  will  become 
independent in distant future.  
A further problem of the current Chinese legal system is corruption.
34 In 
the near future, it will be important for China to minimise the possibility 
of  corruption  in  the  legal  system.  At  present,  there  are  not  any 
significant  statistics  on  the  topic  of  corruption  in  the  Chinese  legal 
system  but  the  rare  figures  that  are  published  give  the  general 
impression that the level of corruption is quite high. This is emphasised 
by the fact that the authorities have introduced several laws to prevent 
corruption within the legal system.
35 
                                                 
31 Peerenboom, R, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) Page 220 f. 
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It is remarkable that the legal system in China, in certain cases, still 
requires  the  approval  of  the  division  chief,  division  committee,  court 
president  or  adjudicative  committee  for  a  judge  to  make  a  valid 
decision. This issue is very important for international foreign investors 
due  to  the  fact  that  politically  sensitive  cases,  bankruptcy  cases  or 
decisions on significant cases with foreign investments belong to the 
group of legal cases that are subject to this approval.
36  
The fact that legal cases dealing with foreign investment are treated 
differently  to  other  cases  in  China  may  trigger  concerns  in  these 
investors,  especially  after  the  Chinese  restrictions  on  foreign 
investments have been relaxed. There are now several opportunities for 
foreign investors to start or expand business in China. The next section 




2.  Company Forms of the People’s Republic of China 
 
Under the current laws, Chinese authorities distinguish companies by 
the structure of the different financial investment. Generally, they can be 
divided  into  two  different  forms  of  companies,  the  State-Owned 
Enterprises on the one hand and the companies with foreign investment 
on  the  other.  Companies  with  foreign  investment  can  be  subdivided 
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according  to  the  amount  of  foreign  investment.
37  The  company  form 
“State-Owned Enterprises” is the first company form described in the 
following section.  
 
2.1.  State-Owned Enterprises 
 
Before the People’s Republic of China allowed foreigners to invest in 
China, the dominant company form known in the country was the so-
called State Owned Enterprise.
38  
State Owned Enterprises are companies whose main shareholder is the 
state  of  China.  As  the  main  shareholder,  the  state  controls  the 
performance  of  the  company  and  the  manager.
39  The  State-Owned 
Enterprises  have  been  performing  very  poorly  in  recent  years.  The 
People’s Republic of China introduced modern corporation laws in order 
to  clarify  the  property  rights  and  separate  the  ownership  from  the 
management.
40  
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There have been various contributory factors in the poor performance of 
these enterprises. Generally speaking, the influence of the government 
on the daily management is one of the reasons that could be claimed a 
key  issue.  A  second  factor  is  the  performance  of  the  company 
managers.  As  long  as  a  manager  has  an  interest  in  increasing  his 
personal bonuses or using company resources for personal reasons, 
hardly any profit can be expected and the financial problems of these 
companies are predestinated.
41 
In  the  past,  the  authorities  tried  to  solve  these  financial  problems  in 
different ways.  
The first attempt to solve this dilemma was to get a foreign investor to 
take over some of the companies’ shares.
42 The investments by these 
foreign investors did not prove to be as successful as the authorities 
had expected and the authorities had to change their policy. Chinese 
authorities  even  established  the  option  that  State-Owned  Enterprises 
can be turned into a stock company and listed on the Chinese stock 
market. For political and economic reasons, the Chinese government 
keeps the majority of the shares in order to prevent the privatisation of 
certain companies.
43  
The next attempt to solve this dilemma was to allow the State-Owned 
Enterprises  to  file  for  bankruptcy.  In  order  to  avoid  massive 
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unemployment and social unrest, the number of companies that were 
allowed to apply for bankruptcy was restricted.
44 
The lack of transparent accounting records of State-Owned Enterprises 
obstructed  nearly  all  possible  alternatives  the  failing  enterprises  had 
under  the  current  bankruptcy  laws.  Mergers,  acquisitions  or 
reconstructions  turned  out  to  be  very  difficult  due  to  problems  with 
accounting standards, the various transfers of assets, the foundation of 
subsidiaries  or  the  change  of  company  names.  These  business 
activities  caused  problems  because  these  operations  did  not  always 
abide by the Chinese laws.
45  
The  People’s  Republic  of  China  is  currently  changing  the  economic 
system from a planned economy to a market economy. In order to fulfil 
the WTO criteria, China has to make several changes to the legal and 
the economic system. As a result of these changes, the company form 
of State-Owned Enterprises will soon be abolished. A larger scale of 
privatisation will replace the system of State-Owned Enterprises but, for 
this, more precise laws and regulations have to be introduced. 
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2.2.  Foreign Investment Enterprises  
 
In  the  1970s,  China’s  policy  towards  foreign  investment  changed. 
Certain special areas in China were entitled to have company forms 
with foreign investment.
46  
One of the first forms of foreign investment to be allowed in China was 
the company form joint venture. Today, there are varieties of different 
foreign investments possible in China.
47 The most important company 
forms are the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise and the different forms 
of joint ventures. China offers two different types of joint ventures, on 
the  one  hand  the  so  called  Equity  Joint  Venture  and  the  so-called 
Cooperative (or Contractual) Joint Venture on the other.
48 The following 
paragraph will provide a general overview of joint ventures.  
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2.3.  Joint Ventures 
 
Joint  venture  in  the  Chinese  sense  meant  that  the  foreign  investors 
were  allowed  to  invest  technology  or  capital  in  a  State-Owned 
Enterprise. Initially, the amount of investment was limited. The Chinese 
companies mainly demanded the investment of modern technology in 
the form of machinery.
49 The form of foreign investment in these foreign 
investment companies changed over the years. The restrictions on the 
minimum  and  the  maximum  amount  of  foreign  investment  were 
changed  by  the  authorities.  The  restrictions  on  special  regions  were 
abolished recently. Abolishing restrictions and a booming economy are 
creating a positive climate for the investment of intangible technology 
like patents or other intellectual properties and financial capital.
50 As a 
result of this positive climate, foreign investors are transferring cash and 
a high amount of valuable intangible assets into China. Joint ventures 
used  to  be  the  only  vehicle  foreign  investors  were  given  by  the 
authorities to enter the Chinese market.
51 Foreign investors are using 
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joint  ventures,  although  some  legal  advisors  indicate  that  there  is  a 
potential risk for intellectual property rights.
52 In the beginning, the joint 
ventures were not allowed to have a foreign investor as the majority 
shareholder. Like other restrictions, this was abolished. As the next step 
in the development of foreign investment, Chinese authorities offered 
foreign investors the opportunity to set up so-called “Wholly Foreign-
Owned Enterprises”.  
 
2.4.  Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
 
The introduction of a broader form of foreign investment than the joint 
venture enterprises allowed non-Chinese investors to hold more than a 
few  shares  or  even  the  majority  of  the  shares.  This  change  in 
investment policy was a consequent step towards the enlargement of 
foreign  investment  in  China.  Chinese  authorities  introduced  the 
company form “Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises”. These companies, 
as  the  name  implies,  allow  foreign  investors  to  hold  one  hundred 
percent of the company’s shares.
53 However, in the early stages, the 
                                                 
Chong, W S & Naganuma, S, "Insurers Find Strategic Path for China Investment" 
(2003) September International Financial Law Review 1 Electronic Proquest (27 
March 2005). 
Chang, T K, “Foreign Technology Transfer” in Cohen, M A, Bang, A E, Mitchell, S J 
(ed), Chinese Intellectual Property Law and Practice, (The Hague, London, Boston: 
Kluwer Law International 1999), 63 Page 63;  
Chan, V, "China: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the PRC" (2001) 
International Financial Law Review 43 Electronic Proquest (27 March 2005).  
52 Devonshire-Ellis, C, "JV vs WFOE" (2004) 5:2 China Briefing 4, 5 
<http://www.china-briefing.com> (27 March 2005).  
53 Devonshire-Ellis, C, "Setting up Your Company in China" (2004) 47:09 Beijing 
Review 37 <http://www.bjreview.com.cn> (14 April 2005);  
Chan, V, "China: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in the PRC" (2001) 
International Financial Law Review 43 Electronic Proquest (27 March 2005). 20 
owners  of  “Wholly  Foreign-Owned  Enterprises”  were  subject  to  strict 
regulations.  In  the  beginning,  these  companies  were  restricted,  for 
example, in the location in which the business could be established or 
the  business  areas  these  companies  could  operate  in.
54  Several  of 
these regulations have now been abolished and the Wholly Foreign-
Owned  Enterprises  are  allowed  to  be  based  outside  the  former 
exclusive special economic zones.
55 Nevertheless, some restrictions still 




3.  Restrictions for Foreign Investment 
 
Most  of  the  restrictions  set  by  the  Chinese  government  have  been 
abolished in recent years. Nevertheless, there are still restrictions on 
the import and the export of technology. In some cases, the transfer is 
restricted  and  in  others  the  transfer  is  banned.
57  For  example,  the 
restriction of foreign investment in the special economic zones and the 
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restrictions on the import of goods produced by Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises  have  been  abolished.  However,  there  are  still  several 
restrictions  in  China  that  are  related  to  foreign  investments.
58  For 
example, certain economic fields or certain technology that are used by 
certain companies are either limited in the amount of foreign investment 
or strictly forbidden for any foreign investment.
59  
This restriction for certain technology has effects on the different forms 
of  investment  in  China.  Several  non-Chinese  investors  are  willing  to 
meet the demands for the transfer of high technology to China and use 
intangible  assets  as  a  part  of  their  paid-in  stock  capital.  Although 
Chinese authorities are very eager to improve the amount of technology 
flowing into China and the authorities are luring foreign investors with 
advantages  such  as  low  taxes  or  cheap  labour,  China  has  other 
restrictions besides these for the foreign investments. Remarkable for 
foreign investors are the restrictions which are related to the foundation 
or investment of companies. In this field, there are further restrictions 
which easily could effect a foreign investment negatively.  
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4.  Restrictions as a Result of Company Laws and 
Regulations 
 
Besides the restrictions on foreign investment in China that are subject 
to  the  different  investment  laws,  foreign  investment  in  China  is 
regulated by the company laws and regulations.  
Although  the  People’s  Republic  of  China  is  looking  to  attract foreign 
investors  to  transfer  as  much  modern  technology  and  capital  as 
possible into China, there is still a concern that the foreign investors 
may fleece the Chinese partners or the Chinese authorities. 
For  example,  the  company  laws  of  China  include  regulations  which 
prescribe how the evaluation of assets is to be carried out. Article 24 of 
the  Regulations  for  the  Implementation  of  the  Law  on  Sino-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures revised 22 July 2001 states that: 
 
The price of the machinery, equipment and other materials referred (to) 
in  the  proceeding  paragraph  shall  not  be  higher  than  the  current 
international market price for similar equipment or materials. 
 
A similar regulation is included in the regulations restricting investment 
for  a  wholly  foreign  investment  company.  Article  26  of  the  Detailed 
Rules for The Implementation of The Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises re-promulgated 12 April 2001 states:  
 23 
The capitalized value of such machinery or equipment shall not exceed 
the current normal price for the same type of items on the international 
market. 
 
In addition to this restriction, there are several other regulations which 
affect  the  investment  of  foreign  investors  in  different  types  of 
companies. These regulations do not only prescribe how the machinery, 
intellectual property or other assets have to be evaluated. For example, 
Article 27 of the Detailed Rules for The Implementation of The Law on 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises states that the amount of industrial 
property rights or proprietary technology which is invested in a Wholly 
Foreign Owned Enterprise is restricted to a maximum of 20% of the 
companies’ registered capital. A comparable regulation was established 
for  joint  venture  enterprises  in  Article  5  of  the  Law  of  the  People's 
Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures amended 
by  the  4th  Session  of  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  9th  National 
People's Congress on 15 March 2000. Article 5 of that law states in the 
last sentence:  
 
The  various  investments  mentioned  above  shall  be  specified  in  the 
contract and articles of association of the equity joint venture and the 
value of each contribution (except for the site) shall be appraised and 
determined through discussions between the parties to the venture.  
 24 
Any agreement has to be submitted for registration to the department 
which  is  in  charge  of  foreign  relations  and  trade.
60  There  is  a  good 
chance that the authorities are using similar measurements for foreign 
investment,
61  although  this  regulation  does  not  state  how  intangible 
assets  could  be  part  of  the  foreign  investment  or  how  much  foreign 
investment could be contributed as an intangible asset.  
On the one hand, the restrictions in the company laws and the particular 
regulation governing how the assets have to be evaluated protect the 
Chinese economy; on the other hand, foreign investors are forced to 
invest capital in addition to these assets. The foreign investors face the 
problem of how to protect their investment.  
Losing  a  financial  investment  is  always  a  problem  for  the  investor. 
Nevertheless, if the investor is losing high advanced technology or other 
valuable intangible assets in addition to the financial investment, this 
loss could easily prove even greater.  
The  bankruptcy  laws  in  China  have  faced  changes  throughout  the 
history  of  China.  Over  the  decades,  bankruptcy  laws  have  faced 
different phases of development. The next chapter gives an overview of 
the development of Chinese bankruptcy laws and regulations.  
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B  Development of Bankruptcy Laws and 
Regulation in China 
 
The development of a national bankruptcy law system in China seems 
to be strongly related to the different political system of power. Over the 
last  few  centuries,  China  has  seen  several  attempts  to  establish  a 
bankruptcy law system.  
In  contrast  to  China,  Germany  has  established  a  bankruptcy  law 
system,  which  has  been  valid  for  over  a  hundred  years.  Although 
Germany, like China, had several different political systems during this 
period, the legal system itself has not changed greatly. The German 
“Konkursordnung” was established in 1877 and replaced on 1 January 
1999  by  the  “Insolvenzordnung”.  Germany’s  bankruptcy  system 
survived  the  transition  to  democracy,  several  lost  wars  and  a 
dictatorship. In evaluating the history of both countries, it should be kept 
in mind that the history of national bankruptcy regulation in Germany 
dates back a little further.  
 
1.  The Historical Changes in Chinese Bankruptcy Laws  
 
The  conviction  of  the  Chinese  authorities  for  the  requirement  of  a 
bankruptcy law can be traced back to the Quing dynasty. Before the 
“Quing dynasty”, the concept of bankruptcy was unknown to the people 
of  China.  Because  of  the  country’s  legal  and  ethical  background, 
children had to pay their father’s debts. In 1906, the Chinese emperor 26 
introduced the first bankruptcy law. This first attempt was only valid for 
two years. The bankruptcy law was annulled by the next emperor of 
China due to problems in its implementation. For the next thirty years, 
China effectively did not have a bankruptcy law. Some of the Chinese 
warlords  in  northern  China  drafted  a  bankruptcy  law  but  it  was  not 
implemented  for  the  whole  nation.  This  changed  in  1935  under  the 
regime of the National Government and a general bankruptcy law was 
introduced. This second attempt at a nationwide bankruptcy law system 
only  lasted  until  the  communist  revolution  as  a  result  of  the  political 
circumstances. After the communists founded the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, the laws implemented by the National Government were 
abolished by the newly-formed government. Due to the separation of 
Taiwan,  the  communist  government  has  no  authority  on  the  island, 
where the bankruptcy law developed by the National Government is still 
in force today.
62  
In mainland China, officially there was no need for a bankruptcy law for 
another  thirty  years.  State-Owned  Enterprises  could  not  go  bankrupt 
under the ideology of the communist leaders.
63 The fact that Chinese 
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enterprises  suffered  heavy  losses  and  could  technically  have  been 
declared bankrupt, was a well-kept secret.
64  
During the 1980s, several Chinese experts from different branches of 
study recognised that changes to the economic system and dealing with 
the  heavy  losses  of  the  State-Owned  Enterprises  were  necessary.
65 
Before the trial bankruptcy law could be introduced, there were furious 
debates related to the legislative process. During this drafting process, 
the fact that State-Owned Enterprises guaranteed the social stability of 
the  country  was  one  of  the  main  arguments  against  its 
implementation.
66 Another argument concerned social stability as well 
but picked up that thread from a different direction. It considered that 
one bankrupt State-Owned Enterprise could trigger a chain reaction of 
bankruptcies  in  China.  The  high  percentage  of  non-performing  loans 
given  to  State-Owned  Enterprises  by  the  state  owned  financial 
institutions  supported this  argument  in  particular.
67  As a  result  of  the 
realisation  of  the  need  for  urgent  changes,  Chinese  authorities 
introduced  the  People's  Republic  of  China’s  Law  on  Enterprise 
Bankruptcy in 1986. This bankruptcy law was introduced on a trial basis 
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and was only applicable to State-Owned Enterprises, so it was only a 
framework  that  had  a  great  number  of  holes.  Given  the  thirty  years 
without  any  bankruptcy  law  before  this  trial  implementation,  Chinese 
authorities  soon  recognised  these  discrepancies.  As  a  second  step, 
chapter 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure was added on 9 April 1991. 
This chapter of the Civil Procedure Law was intended to establish the 
basic  rules  for  handling  bankruptcy  in  China.  The  implementation  of 
Chapter 19 in the Civil Procedure Law greatly changed the bankruptcy 
culture  in  China.  The  proceedings  under  Chapter  19  have  not  been 
combined with a certain type of enterprise. Consequently, Chapter 19 is 
generally applicable to all forms of entities with a legal person status. 
Several  bankruptcies  of  State-Owned  Enterprises  and  various  other 
company  forms,  e.g.  those  with  foreign  investment,  followed  these 
proceedings.
68  
In addition to the changes in the Civil Procedure Law, a further juristic 
matter  concerning  the  bankruptcy  laws  arose  in  1991. The  Supreme 
People's Court issued the first interpretation of the bankruptcy law on  
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7 November 1991.
69 The fact that the Supreme People's Court had to 
give  an  interpretation  is  a  first  indicator  that  the  bankruptcy  system 
contained certain inconsistencies and needed some revision.  
The process of adjusting the bankruptcy legislation led to the addition of 
some  articles  to  the  People's  Republic  of  China  Company  Law  in 
1993.
70  
As the bankruptcy law of the central government did not cover all of the 
different  company  forms,  was  unclear  and  complicated  on  certain 
points,  some  provinces  introduced  regulations  that  addressed  the 
bankruptcy  topic  in  1993.  The  provincial  governments  of  the  special 
economic zones of the Guangdong and Shenzhen provinces released 
their regulations on company bankruptcies.
71  
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In  order  to  control  the  bankruptcy  policy,  the  State  Council  has 
published several policy documents concerning the bankruptcy of State-
Owned Enterprises since 1994.
72 
In  addition  to  the  laws  and  regulations,  measures  on  liquidation 
procedures  for  foreign  investment  enterprises  were  introduced  in 
1996.
73  
In 1997, the Supreme People's Court published another notice dealing 
with the bankruptcy law. The Supreme People's Court tried to clarify 
some contradictions in the wording of the bankruptcy laws.
74  
The latest decision by the Supreme People's Court, dated 18 July 2002, 
issued a notice in relation to court proceedings in bankruptcy cases.
75  
Currently,  there  are  different  regulations  and  laws  applicable  to  the 
different  forms  of  companies  in  China.  Even  the  area  in  which  the 
company  is  located  can  have  a  different  influence  on  the  laws  and 
regulations which apply. Some of the rules that are applicable turned 
out to be very complex or even contradictory. There were concerns that 
the confused system of bankruptcy laws had been kept alive in order to 
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have  a  certain  amount  of  flexibility  in  the  case  of  a  state  owned 
company going bankrupt. Since 2001, China has been a member of the 
WTO and is striving to be considered as a market economy. In order to 
achieve the aim of being declared a market economy, China still has to 
address several issues. One of these issues is the implementation of a 
structured bankruptcy law system. The EU will not consider China as a 
market economy without a well-developed and transparent bankruptcy 
law.  The  equal  treatment  of  the  different  company  forms  during  the 
bankruptcy procedure will be one of the measures for a fair and equal 
trade  system  in  particular.
76  Even  researchers  in  China  consider  the 
current bankruptcy law to be inappropriate and have called for changes 
to  the  current  law.
77  As  China  authorities  became  aware  of  these 
demands for a transparent bankruptcy system, the drafting process for 
a new bankruptcy law became increasingly necessary.
78 Several drafts 
have been discussed and many changes have been made to create a 
modern bankruptcy law that might bring stability and legal certainty.
79 
This drafting process for the new Chinese bankruptcy law started more 
than ten years ago. Several authors expected the new bankruptcy law 
to take effect by the spring of 2005 but the legislation process was not 
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completed until mid 2005.
80 There is still a good chance that these laws 
will be passed this year and could be effective by early 2006.  
The urgency of changes to the bankruptcy law system seemed to return 
to the focus of the authority’s minds after a massive bankruptcy case 
shocked the international and Chinese public and the international call 
for a clear provision grew louder.  
The next paragraph provides a brief overview of the bankruptcy cases 
of the People’s Republic of China.  
 
2.  Statistics of Cases of Bankruptcy in the People’s 
Republic of China 
 
Prior  to  1986,  when  the  first  bankruptcy  law  was  established  in  the 
People’s Republic of China, the authorities tried to conceal the fact that 
a  state-owned  company  went  bankrupt.  Because  of  Chinese 
governmental policy, there is hardly any documentation on bankruptcies 
or  companies  with  serious  financial  problems  before  that  time.  Even 
after the Bankruptcy law became effective, the number of documented 
bankruptcy  cases  was  very  small.  During  the  first  few  years,  the 
different governments seemed to avoid bankruptcy if possible. A very 
common way of achieving this was to turn the company from a state- 
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owned  company  into a  Foreign  Joint  Venture  Company.
81  As foreign 
investment  was  limited  to  certain  provinces,  this  solution  was  only 
applicable to provinces that enjoyed the status of a special economic 
zone.  
Since the early 1990s, the People’s Republic of China has developed 
the  experiment  of  avoiding  bankruptcies  through  mergers  and 
acquisitions.
82 The appointed number of cities taking part in this model 
experiment increased from 18 in 1994 to 111 cities by 1997. Within the 
first year of that experiment, the number of State-Owned Enterprises 
filing for bankruptcy hardly changed. In the second year, twice as many 
companies  merged  as  had  to  file  for  bankruptcy.
83  During  the 
experiment,  the  Chinese  authorities  discovered  that  this  attempt  to 
solve  the  financial  problems  of  State-Owned  Enterprises  through 
mergers  was  not  proving  successful.  Finally,  in  2000,  the  central 
government changed its policy and became dedicated to the idea “more 
bankruptcies less mergers”.
84 
Under  these  circumstances,  no  statistics  can  accurately  express  the 
actual evolution of bankruptcy in China.  
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Nevertheless,  some  articles  refer  to  official  statistics  and  attempt  to 
demonstrate that the number of bankruptcies is generally increasing in 
China. Although the total number of bankruptcies has been increasing 
through the years, these figures do not illustrate the real situation in 
China due to the governmental policy. Li Shuguang reports the figures 
documented by the Supreme Court Annual Work Report. This report 
shows  how  the  number  of  bankruptcy  cases  increased  in  the  initial 
years of Chinese bankruptcy legislation.
85  
 
Year    Bankruptcies per Year 
     
1989     98  
1990    32 
1991    117  
1992    428  
1993    710  
1994    1,625  
1995    2,583 
1996    5,875  
1997    5,396 
 
There do not seem to be any other figures available as these specific 
figures from the Supreme Court Annual Work Report can be found in 
                                                 
85 Li, S, „Bankruptcy Law in China: Lessons of the Past Twelve Years“ (2001) 5:1 
Harvard Asia Quarterly 
<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200101/0101a006.htm> (17 April 2005). 35 
various publications.
86 The current statistics for cases of bankruptcy in 
China  are  not  given  in  detail.  Wu´s  suggestion  for  the  increase  in 
bankruptcy in State-Owned Enterprises is an approximate rise of 1.5% 
between 1998 and 2000.
87 Regardless of these figures, a huge number 
of Chinese companies are technically bankrupt but cannot be declared 
bankrupt,  due  to  the  government  authorities’  refusal  to  agree  to  the 
bankruptcy petition.
88 The reason for this discrepancy lies in the current 
law  and  the  interaction  of  authorities  and  courts.  Another  reason  for 
incorrect  statistics  is  evident  in  the  problems  authorities  have  with 
statistics  in  general.
89  The  current  bankruptcy  policy  states  that  the 
decision as to whether a bankruptcy petition is authorised or not can 
only  be  made  by  the  government.
90  Because  of  the  necessary 
governmental approval, a system of understanding and converting the 
bankruptcy law has been created. The Chinese authorities seemed to 
recognize  their  approval  of  a  bankruptcy  petition  more  as  a  political 
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question than an economical one.
91 After this political decision is made, 
the  bankruptcy  petition  concerning  a  State-Owned  Enterprise  is 
forwarded  to  the  court.  A  judge  then  has  to  decide  whether  the 
requirements of the current law have been met. In Article 7, the current 
bankruptcy law states the reason why a creditor can apply to declare a 
company bankrupt.  
 
According to the first sentence of Article 7 of the current bankruptcy law:  
“Where  a  debtor  is  unable  to  discharge  a  matured  liability,  a 
creditor may apply for the debtor to be declared bankrupt(cy).” 
 
In  addition  to  Article  7,  Article  2  of  the  current  law  also  has  to  be 
considered.  
The first sentence of Article 3 of the current bankruptcy law states:  
“Enterprises  which  have  incurred  serious  losses  due  to  poor 
management  and  administration  and  are  unable  to  discharge 
matured liabilities will declare bankruptcy in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law.” 
 
In order to declare a company bankrupt, the judge has to answer the 
following questions. 
Firstly, can the company repay the debts?  
Secondly,  is  the  company  suffering  “serious  losses  due  to  poor 
management”?  
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The question as to whether a company is able to pay back its debts 
might be relatively easy to answer. Generally speaking, the question 
can be answered by any judge if the relevant company records are valid 
and traceable. The traceability of a company’s records is an important 
factor in finding an answer to that question. Nevertheless, the issue of 
the traceability of a company records is not unique to the bankruptcy 
law and will not be discussed in this thesis.  
The second question deals with a known legal issue. Article 3 of the 
current bankruptcy law states two requirements that contain indefinite 
legal  terms.  To  declare  a  company  bankrupt,  a  judge  has  to  decide 
what he considers as “serious losses” and whether these losses are 
related to “poor management”. Both terms “serious losses” and “poor 
management” are not defined by the law and there is a wide scope for 
the judges’ decision-making.
92  
Considering these legal questions, it is unlikely that a judge will declare 
a company bankrupt. As the judges are appointed by the government, 
the decision made by the judges does not usually vary from that of the 
government.
93 In the worst case scenario, this could even mean that the 
court decision contradicts the bankruptcy law.
94 
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The  combination  of  the  legal  questions  and  the  governmental 
authorisation of a bankruptcy petition is another reason why the official 
statistics cannot provide a reliable picture of bankruptcy in China.  
Some analysts forecast that the new bankruptcy law will apply to nearly 
118 million companies. According to their speculation under the new 
law,  approximately  eight  million  companies  will  have  to  file  for 
bankruptcy in the near future. The government made an exception for 
some 2000 companies, especially in the military and mining business, 
in order to protect these companies for the next three to five years.
95 
 
The  following  paragraphs  will  examine  examples  of  so-called  policy-
oriented  bankruptcy  and  provide  examples  of  how  bankruptcy 
procedures have been manipulated under the current bankruptcy laws. 
The  cases  of  bankruptcy  chosen  illustrate  how  manipulations  are 
carried  out  before  and  after  the  companies  have  been  declared 
bankrupt.  
The  first  example  shows  how  a  company  has  been  forced  into 
bankruptcy by direct governmental manipulation. The second example 
describes  the  different  methods  of  manipulation  by  a  liquidation 
committee to systematically disadvantage creditors. 
The  bankruptcy  of  the  Zhongjiang  Silk  Company  serves  as  a  prime 
example  of  how  a  fraudulent  bankruptcy  can  be  arranged  by 
government officials. 
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3.  Examples 
 
In  order  to  give  an  insight  into  bankruptcy  practice  in  China,  the 
following paragraphs describe the bankruptcy cases of the Zhongjiang 
Silk Company and the Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Company.  These  examples  show  the  different  effects  which  might 
occur.  
 
3.1.  The Zhongjiang Silk Company Case  
 
In  1982,  Zhongjiang  Silk  Company  was  founded  as  a  state-owned 
commercial and trade enterprise. The company’s main business was 
sale and purchase of pod and raw silk. Zhongjiang County granted the 
Zhongjiang Silk Company the exclusive right to operate in the business 
and the company apparently performed very well. As a result of its good 
performance,  several  financial  institutions  rated  Zhongjiang  Silk 
Company  as  an  “AA credit  enterprise” or  a  “superfine  and first-class 
credit enterprise”. In fact, the company had to pay Zhongjiang County 
more taxes between 1995 and 1999 than Zhongjiang County expected. 
In  spite  of  this,  officials  created  a  plan  to  force  the  company  into 
bankruptcy. Different departments and even the courts were involved in 
the plan, which finally ended with the bankruptcy of the Zhongjiang Silk 
Company.  In  order  to  achieve  this,  Zhongjiang  County  authorities 
arranged that several different companies linked to the Zhongjiang Silk 40 
Company  filed  for  bankruptcy.  As  a  direct  consequence  of  these 
bankruptcies,  the  claims  against  these  companies  held  by  the 
Zhongjiang Silk Company disappeared. In addition to the manipulation 
of  debts,  the  Zhongjiang  financial  bureau  claimed  the  immediate 
recovery of debts. The culmination of these coincidences meant that the 
Zhongjiang Silk Company could be declared bankrupt. To make things 
even  worse,  the  Zhongjiang  authorities  advised  the  Zhongjiang  Silk 
Company to withdraw its capital, as well as submit the balance sheets 
and accounts in such a way that it could be assumed that the company 
was insolvent. The court responsible accepted the bankruptcy petition 
without  any  serious  examination  and  appointed  the  liquidation 
committee.  The  liquidation  committee  was  established  the  same  day 
the  Zhongjiang  Silk  Company  was  declared  bankrupt  and  a  vice-
secretary of the Zhongjiang County Commission was appointed head of 
the committee. A newly founded company acquired the assets of the 
Zhongjiang Silk Company at auction. Generally speaking, if something 
is sold at auction the procedure is fair. However, in this particular case, 
the government had designated who would be allowed to acquire the 
company’s assets in advance. Coincidentally, this particular company 
had been founded by the Zhongjiang County shortly before the auction. 
In the end, the Zhongjiang County authorities were able to retain control 
over the relevant assets and reduced the debts owed to the different 
creditors.
96  
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This  case  is  a  prime  example  of  how  different  provincial  authorities, 
courts and creditors could cooperate under the current law in order to 
abolish debts and retain control over the relevant assets of a company. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  this  way  of  escaping  debts  is  fraud  under 
Chinese legislation. It could even be suggested that local governments 
use the bankruptcy law to achieve the new system of market economy. 
The fact that those responsible for the manipulation in the case of the 
Zhongjiang Silk Company have been punished shows that there is a 
general understanding of how business should be carried out and how 
bankruptcy law should be used.  
 
The case of the Zhongjiang Silk Company illustrates how bankruptcy 
has  been  used  under  the  current  law  to  reduce  debts.  Even  if  a 
company  is  not  forced  by  the  authorities  to  file  for  bankruptcy,  the 
following example shows that there are nevertheless other opportunities 
to  manipulate  the  bankruptcy  proceedings  in  order  to  minimise  the 
financial damage. 
In  the  documentation  of  the  bankruptcy  case  of  the  Guangdong 
International  Trust  and  Investment  Company,  manipulation  by  the 
authorities, which could have forced the company into bankruptcy, is 
mentioned. However, the following section will illustrate how subtle the 
influence under the current law can be. 
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3.2.  The Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Company Case  
 
The Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company (GITIC) 
was one of the larger financial companies in Chinese history that had to 
file for bankruptcy. In addition, the GITIC bankruptcy case is one of the 
rare  examples  that  describe  a  recent  bankruptcy  which  could  be 
observed by the public in and out of China.  
The court responsible declared GITIC bankrupt on 16 January 1999.
97 A 
short summary of the bankruptcy case will highlight the most interesting 
details,  especially  as  these  particulars  occurred  before  the  court 
declared the company bankrupt.  
GITIC  was  one  of  the  leading  financial  companies  with  several 
subsidiaries within and outside China. The creditors of GITIC had been 
informed of the closure of the company by the People’s Bank of China 
on 6 October 1998. This public announcement did not contain any hint 
that  the  company  had  to  file  for  bankruptcy.  Instead  of  this,  the 
announcement contained other information on the creditors. One issue 
that  was  mentioned  in  the  announcement  was  the  invitation  to  all 
creditors to register their debts within a three-month period. There was 
no  reason for  the  creditors  to  become  suspicious  as  a  result  of  this 
information  or  the  information  that  an  asset  transfer  of  GITIC´s 
securities trading business to one of the company’s competitors would 
be carried out. Experience with Chinese bankruptcy proceedings gave 
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no  reason  for  the  foreign  creditors  to  worry  as  the  proceedings 
announced appeared to be normal.
98 
As it turned out, this announcement was one of several different things 
which  happened  throughout  the  downfall  of  GITIC  that  should  have 
made foreign investors question Chinese bankruptcy practice. Right at 
the beginning of the winding-up process, the creditors were surprised 
by the fact that the number of subsidiaries had doubled and the amount 
of  assets  halved.  Besides  the  aforementioned  asset  transfer  of  the 
securities trading business, a further asset transfer had been arranged 
by the liquidation committee. GITIC´s assets included some stakes in 
China’s largest nuclear power plant. These assets could not be sold on 
the open market due to the fact that their transfer to a foreign party was 
not  permitted.
99  After  the  transfer  of  valuable  assets,  the  creditors 
complained that these assets had been sold at a suspiciously low price. 
However,  the  complaints  and  arguments brought  up  by  the  creditors 
had no effect on the decision of the liquidation committee.
100  
 
China Daily quotes a Hong Kong lawyer who was of the opinion that 
GITIC’s  bankruptcy  “...was  an  unusual  case,  born  of  unusual 
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circumstances”.
101 As the article by Zhao examines the potential failures 
of  financial  institutions  becoming  bankrupt,  this  statement  could  only 
refer to the business developments of GITIC before the company had to 
file for bankruptcy.  
A  further  article  discusses  suspicion  regarding  the  behaviour  of  the 
Chinese  authorities.  In  this  article,  Shi  assumes  that  the  Chinese 
authorities realised the full extent of GITIC´s financial dilemma after the 
announcement  by  the  People’s  Bank  of  China.  As  the  authorities 
discovered  that  there  was  no  way  of  saving  GITIC,  the  authorities 
seemed to try their best to minimise the financial damage. As a reaction 
to that perception, the Chinese authorities seemed to change their mind 
and allowed the company to file for bankruptcy. As the next step, some 
members  of  the  provincial  government  and  larger  Chinese  creditors 
were announced as members of the liquidation committee.
102 As some 
of  the  creditors  were  appointed,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  some 
assets were valued and sold to those companies at a low price.  
On the one hand, this could explain the fact that assets were sold at a 
very low price to the organisations of some members of the liquidation 
committee. On the other hand, it must be taken in consideration that 
some  of  GITIC´s  assets  were  shares,  like  the  stakes  in  the  nuclear 
power  plant,  which  could  not  be  transferred  to  foreign  parties.
103  As 
these assets had to be sold to a Chinese company it is very likely that it 
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was in the interests of the members of the provincial government to sell 
those assets at a low price. Considering these circumstances, it is quite 
reasonable to save the valuable assets by transferring them to different 
state companies.  
Some foreign creditors wondered if it was a coincidence that some of 
the acquiring companies had a seat on the liquidation committee. The 
question might be raised as to whether there was a conflict of interest in 
the disposal of these assets. One example of conflicting interest is the 
fact that these assets were sold to some creditors at a low price. These 
creditors were given a huge advantage in the struggle for the recovery 
of  outstanding  debts.  An  additional  example  of  conflicting  interests 
could  be  the  fact  that  the  liquidation  committee  decided  that  local 
Chinese creditors would be satisfied before their foreign counterparts. 
In  the  end,  the  members  of  the  liquidation  committee  did  their 
organisations a second favour because their organisations were also 
local Chinese creditors. This meant these Chinese creditors would be 
satisfied before the foreign creditors in the case of any repayment and 
would  gain  a  further  advantage.  The  main  financial  damage  was 
suffered by the foreign creditors who had been relying on the Chinese 
bankruptcy system.  
The  example  given  by  the  GITIC  bankruptcy  case  shows  how  the 
Chinese authorities can strategically benefit from the bankruptcy of a 
State-Owned Enterprise. It is not necessary to plan a bankruptcy like 
that described in the Zhongjiang Silk Company case.  
These  examples  illustrate  how  Chinese  authorities  can  influence  the 
bankruptcy  of  a  State-Owned  Enterprise.  Unfortunately,  no  example 46 
could be found of how the authorities could influence the bankruptcy of 
a foreign investment company. However, the general consensus of the 
Chinese  authorities  seems  to  be  that  the  bankruptcy  of  a  foreign 
investment  enterprise  is  not  desirable.
104  China’s  authorities  seem  to 
remain silent on anything that is related to the bankruptcy of a foreign 
investment company. Most articles published in China merely mention 
that  there  have  been  bankruptcy  cases  of  foreign  investment 
companies  but  hardly  any  of  the  articles  provide  any  detailed 
documentation.
105  
Nevertheless, both of the examples given here show that the current 
bankruptcy law contains loopholes and is in urgent need of attention by 
the  Chinese  central  government.  As,  amongst  others,  the  European 
Union  is  demanding  a  unified  Chinese  bankruptcy  law,  the  Chinese 
authorities have been forced to accelerate the drafting process for the 
new bankruptcy law. In addition to the demands of the European Union, 
several economic reasons made it reasonable for the People’s Republic 
of China to revise the bankruptcy law.  
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4.  The Economic Effects of the Current Chinese 
Bankruptcy Laws 
 
As  any  nation’s  economy,  the  Chinese  economy  is  subject  to  the 
market forces. This is a fact that Chinese leaders have to deal with and 
cannot ignore if they want to transform China into a market economy.  
One  of  the  issues  that  has  been  addressed  is  the  bankruptcy  law 
system. As every national economy requires regulations on the different 
ways  in  which  a  company  can  be  founded,  there  have  to  be  clear 
regulations on how  a  company  can be  closed. If a  country  only  has 
regulations  and  laws  that  structure  the  foundation  of  companies,  an 
essential part of the economic cycle is missing.
106 Various authors have 
pointed out that inefficient bankruptcy laws could severely damage or 
even ruin the entire economy.
107  
China  has  to  change  its  current  bankruptcy  law  system.  The  current 
system  contains  loopholes,  is  inconsistent  and  lacks  structure.  By 
eliminating  the  multiple  inadequacies  in  the  different  bankruptcy 
regulations,  the  climate  for  foreign  investment  could  become  much 
better. Although foreign investors are withholding some of their potential 
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investments, the Chinese economy is currently booming. As the total 
amount of foreign investments in China is still increasing
108, the current 
Chinese  policy  of  avoiding  widespread  bankruptcies  seems  to  be 
working. However, if a reliable bankruptcy law system were in place, 
foreign investment in China could be much higher. Foreign investors 
are still looking at examples like the GITIC case and are not willing to 
take similar risks again.  
 
One  effect  on  the  economy  is  evident  in  the  delay  of  bankruptcy 
proceedings.  China’s  current  system  provides  the  possibility  of 
disposing of a company’s assets prior to bankruptcy.
109 The avoidance 
of repaying the creditors´ debts will damage the creditors´ interests. The 
reduction of debts to be recovered could lead to a surge of bankruptcies 
amongst the creditors of that company. This possibility has threatened 
Chinese authorities since the 1980s when the current law was under 
discussion.
110  In  fact,  if  the  Chinese  authorities  do  not  manage  the 
bankruptcy petitions of weak State-Owned Enterprises, there may be 
the risk of a surge of bankruptcies that could shake China’s economy. 
 
China is currently trying to convince the members of the WTO that it 
has a market economy. Several countries are still refusing this request 
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by Chinese authorities and are unwilling to grant China the status of a 
market economy. However, most of the countries denying China this 
status are willing to change their decision in exchange for a variety of 
changes in the country.  
The  European  Union,  for  example,  is  one  of  the  most  significant 
partners  refusing  to  accept  that  China  is  a  market  economy.  The 
changes  to  the  Chinese  bankruptcy  laws  are  one  of  the  European 
Union’s demands.
111 Besides the bankruptcy law, there are three other 
topics  that  have  to  be  addressed  before  the  European  Union  will 
change  its  decision.  One  of  the  other  areas  the  European  Union  is 
demanding  changes  in  is  strongly  related  to  the  bankruptcy  law.
  112 
Without a well-organised accounting system, it is impossible to answer 
the question as to whether a company is bankrupt. 
The examples given show that there is a wide variety of possibilities for 
the authorities to influence the bankruptcy system.  
For  China,  the  status  of  a  market  economy  is  not  only  a  quest  for 
prestige. The WTO has different regulations for members with a market 
economy and those who do not. Consequently, recognition as a market 
economy is a vital issue for China.  
Besides the effects on trade, there may be further consequences. If the 
discussion  on  Basel  II  regulations  for  ranking  of  financial  investment 
becomes operative, China will suffer additional negative effects. In the 
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worst case scenario, any investment in China will be rated as a much 
higher risk than a comparable investment in a country that has a more 
structured  bankruptcy  law  system.
113  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
investment  is  any  safer  in  the  other  country,  but  the  chances  of 
recovering the money invested is a risk factor that will have to be taken 
into consideration by the financing companies. As stated in the Basel II 
stipulations, the interest rates for investments with a higher risk factor 
have  to  be  higher.  Therefore,  China  will  have  to  pay  higher  interest 
rates for foreign capital.  
If  China  wants  to  be recognised  as  a  market  economy  and  become 
eligible for the Basel II regulations, the Chinese bankruptcy laws have 
to meet international standards.  
During the last decade, a drafting committee tried to establish a modern 
bankruptcy  law.  Currently,  the  Standing  Committee  of  the  National 
People’s Congress is discussing the draft for the second time. The next 
section will highlight certain elements of the final draft. 
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C  The new Bankruptcy Law of China 
 
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has been 
discussing  the  latest  draft  of  the  New  Bankruptcy  Law  since  June 
2004.
114 At this stage, it is not clear whether the name of the law will be 
changed by the committee or not. During the drafting process, most of 
the  authors  simply  referred  to  the  draft  of  the  new  law  as  the 
“bankruptcy law”.
115 Although there is still a chance that the new law will 
carry a different name in the final stage of the legislation process, the 
change should not make any substantial alterations to the content.  
In 2004, legal experts forecasted that the legislation process could be 
completed by the end of 2004 and the law could be effective by early 
2005.
116 In fact, the legislation process was not completed until June 
2005, thus reducing the chances for the adoption of this law by 2006. 
For some reason, the discussion within the Standing Committee has 
taken  an  astonishingly  long  time.  Most  of  the  arguments  were 
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discussed during the ten year drafting process and, in light of this, it is 
strange that the Standing Committee needs such a long time.
117  
From the drafting process, some financial experts forecasted economic 
consequences,  if  the  introduction  of  the  drafts  to  the  public  were 
delayed.
118  Consequently,  it  is  highly  likely  that  the  delay  in  very 
important  changes  to  the  current  bankruptcy  law  system  is  causing 
damage to the Chinese economy.  
Several  points  were  on  the  agenda during  the  drafting  process. The 
new  law  should,  for  example,  pay  respect  to  the  current  status  of 
changes  in  the  processes  of  economic  development  and  should 
consider the needs of a bankrupt company’s employees. The threat of a 
massive increase in unemployment and political instability as a result of 
the  new  bankruptcy  law  were  some  of  the  major  issues  discussed 
during the drafting process.
119 Due to these concerns, the resettlement 
of  laid-off  workers  became  one  of  the  important  arguments  in  the 
discussion throughout the different levels of government.
120  
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Besides  these  social  and  political  points,  the  new  bankruptcy  law  is 
expected to apply to all company forms in China and should protect the 
rights of every party involved in the bankruptcy proceedings.
121  
During the discussion on how the different parties could be protected, 
some emotional statements were made. One example is a comment in 
the  China  Daily,  dated  on  16  August  2004,  claiming  that  the 
“…government  departments  in  China  have  generally  overprotected 
investors.”
122  Although  the  author  explains  his  comment  on 
“governmental overprotection” as a “byproduct” of the former planned 
economy
123,  this  argument  can  be  considered  as  “ironic”,  especially 
after the GITIC bankruptcy case showed that foreign investors suffered 
the  largest  losses.  Cao,  a  member  of  the  agency  that  drafted  the 
current  bankruptcy  law,  admitted  that  he  thinks  the  protection  of 
interests and rights of creditors is a weakness of the current bankruptcy 
law.
124  
In theory, the protection of secured rights and interests is a driving force 
towards  the  stability  of  the  growing  Chinese  economy.
125  In  order  to 
achieve the changes in the Chinese economy, the draft pays tribute to 
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this theory and creates a system of protection for secured rights and 
interests. This system is guided by the idea that secured assets will not 
become part of the bankruptcy assets. Once these changes have been 
implemented,  the  interests  of  foreign  and  Chinese  investors  will  be 
protected.  Generally  speaking,  there  will  be  no  guarantee  that  the 
secured debts are safe and can be recovered in the end. This insecurity 
arises because in some cases one asset is securing two debts and both 
debtors cannot be one hundred percent sure of recovering their debts in 
full.  
Retaining the creditors meeting was supposed to protect the rights of 
creditors and secured creditors in particular.
126 In theory, this creditors’ 
meeting  is  supposed  to  have  the  power  to  guide  and  supervise  all 
proceedings  within  the  bankruptcy  process.  One  of  the  following 
sections  will  provide  an  overview  of  the  advantages  the  creditors 
meeting will bring under the new law and try to explain what potential 
problems the creditors may face.  
According to the 2002 draft, the new bankruptcy law will be applicable 
to most corporate forms. Some of the lawmakers did not accept the 
idea  of  a  general  bankruptcy  law  that  would  be  applicable  to  all 
corporate  forms  in  all  economic  areas.  An  intense  discussion  was 
necessary to convince most of the critics. Although the new bankruptcy 
law  will  be  applicable  generally,  some  exceptions  will  be  made  for 
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certain  companies,  such  as  financial  institutions,  or  some  special 
economic sectors.
127 The fact that some of China’s financial institutions 
are  already  facing  enormous  problems  due  to  mismanagement  or  a 
high  number  of  so-called  “non-performing  loans”  supports  this  very 
sensitive discussion. Some authors estimate that the total amount of 
“non-performing  loans”  given  to  state-owned  companies  from  state-
owned banks in 2000 represented 25-50 % of the state-owned banks’ 
total lending.
128 During this discussion, some of the lawmakers predicted 
the threat of a general financial crisis should State-Owned Enterprises 
go bankrupt, which could in turn lead to multiple losses and affect other 
larger creditors.
129 Various different approaches have been considered 
to find a suitable way of regulating financial institutions which have to 
file  for  bankruptcy.  The  alternatives  discussed  ranged  from  the 
introduction  of  separate  legislation  for  the  bankruptcy  of  financial 
institutions  to  an  unsophisticated  inclusion  in  a  general  bankruptcy 
law.
130  Finally,  it  was  widely  accepted  that  it  is  necessary  to  have  a 
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general regulation that includes the bankruptcy of financial institutions. 
Nevertheless,  the  state  council  will  be  granted  the  power  to  adopt 
special  regulations  as  an  addition  to  the  new  bankruptcy  law.
131  The 
introduction of these special regulations could be regarded as a form of 
compromise  to  cover  both  extreme  positions.  These  additional 
regulations will be created by the state council once the law is finally 
effective. Some of these special regulations will govern the bankruptcy 
of  commercial  banks  and  insurance  companies.  Chinese  lawmakers 
took  into  consideration  the  special  situation  of  all  different  forms  of 
financial companies and recognised the necessity of introducing special 
regulations in order to avoid social unrest and preserve order. These 
special regulations in particular will primarily protect customer assets 
placed in trusts and assuage the fears of Chinese private investors.
132  
In general, most of the recommended changes were transcribed in the 
2002 draft and some approved regulations specified. 
Therefore, liquidation is still one of the possible procedures in the new 
bankruptcy law, but the new law will not concentrate on the bankrupt 
company’s  process  of  liquidation.  The  main  focus  will  fall  on  the 
question as to how liquidation can be avoided.
133 Accordingly, the most 
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significant  change  will  probably  be  the  detailed  regulations  on  the 
reconstruction or reorganization of a bankrupt company.
134 Although the 
focal  point  is  the  reconstruction  of  the  bankrupt  company,  some 
additions will be made to the current regulations on how liquidation is to 
be carried out. In the context of liquidation and reorganisation, China 
has not solved all of its problems related to the question of property 
code.
135 This makes it difficult to answer the question as to whether a 
particular asset belongs to a bankrupt company.
136 
Another  significant  change  is  the  universal  treatment  of  most 
companies and the reduction of governmental influence on bankruptcy 
proceedings.
137  Generally  speaking,  the  current  laws  require 
governmental approval by the relevant authorities if a company is filing 
for bankruptcy.
138  
The Chinese government is still trying to change the planned economy 
into a market economy. These changes in the economic system should 
minimise  the  influence  of  governmental  officials.  However,  the 
surprising effect of these changes on the economic system is not a fall 
in governmental influence but rather the reverse. In order to accomplish 
                                                 
134 Lan, X, "Outdated Bankruptcy Law Upgraded" (2004) 47:30 Beijing Review 38 
<http://www.bjreview.com.cn> (13 April 2005). 
135 Ho, L, "Chapter VI, Section 3 - Bankruptcy Property" papers from the 2000 
Symposium on Bankruptcy Law Page 1 <http://www.gtz-legal-
reform.org.cn/english/projects/fec/papers_2000bl.htm> (29 July 2005). 
136 Ho, L, "Chapter VI, Section 6 - Right of Priority and Section 7 - Appraisal and 
Distribution" papers from the 2000 Symposium on Bankruptcy Law Page 2 
<http://www.gtz-legal-reform.org.cn/english/projects/fec/papers_2000bl.htm> (29 July 
2005) 
137 Gebhardt, I & Olbrich, K, "New Developments in the Reform of Chinese Bankruptcy 
Law" (2000) 12 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, 38 Electronic LexisNexis (31 
March 2005). 
138 Barker, M & Purser, R, “Bankruptcy Reform in China” (2004) Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer Page 1 
<http://www.freshfields.com/practice/finance/publications/pdfs/9710.pdf> (07 March 
2005). 58 
these changes, several state-owned companies have turned into limited 
companies. The result of these transformations is that the government 
authorities are in the position of controlling shareholder. This position 
establishes new power for the authorities. They retain the influence to 
decide  the  economic  future  of  any  of  these  companies.  This  power 
includes  the  possibility  to  file  for  bankruptcy.  Effectively,  government 
officials are doubling their influence. Firstly, they are gaining this new 
position  as  the  controlling  shareholder  and,  secondly,  they  are  not 
forfeiting their position as the approval authorities.
139  
In  addition,  there  is  another  way  in  which  the  governmental 
organisations maintain their influence. On the one hand, it is possible 
under the current regulations and laws for governmental organisations 
to act as members of a liquidation committee. On the other hand, they 
are supposed to control the liquidation committee.
140 In addition to their 
dual role as executor and administrator of the proceedings, the courts 
also  have  to  rely  upon  the  information  provided  by  the  government 
authorities or the liquidation committee. This information is necessary 
for the courts to make a decision. As a result of this dependence, the 
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judges  have  to  cooperate  closely  with  the  authorities.  This  situation 
makes it practically impossible for the judges to pass a fair and impartial 
judgement for all parties.
141 To make things worse for the judges, the 
government still has the general power to recall the judge if he does not 
make  a  decision  in  their  favour.
142  Because  of  the  complex  status 
occupied  by  governmental  authorities,  it  can  be  claimed  that  the 
authorities  have  the  power  to  consider  and  accommodate  local 
interests.  The  assurance  of  local  interests  inevitably  leads  to 
discrimination against foreign investors.  
The new bankruptcy law will constitute a very important step towards a 
market economy, although there are still some remnants of the planned 
economy in the draft.
143 These could easily become a serious problem.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned changes, some of the more significant 
changes  will  be  emphasised  in  the  following  sections.  As  already 
mentioned,  the  new  bankruptcy  law  offers  a  variety  of  different 
procedures and certain flexibility in the adjustment of the procedures 
during a bankruptcy case.
144  
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Several  modern  bankruptcy  laws  have  already  introduced  detailed 
models  for  reconstruction  or  reorganisation  in  order  to  improve  the 
common alternative to the liquidation of a company.  
 
1.  Reconstruction  
 
The current draft version of the bankruptcy law implemented in China 
does  not  offer  liquidation  as  the  sole  solution  for  a  company  facing 
bankruptcy.
145  However,  the  regulations  are  not  very  specific.  The 
bankrupt  company,  for  example,  is  not  provided  with  a  detailed 
alternative  to  liquidation.  Most  of  the  other  modern  bankruptcy  laws 
include detailed regulations on reconstruction or reorganisation. Under 
the  current  Chinese  laws,  this  is  missing.
146  At  present,  the  Chinese 
authorities  are  still  trying  to  recover  the  valuable  assets  prior  to  the 
liquidation of an insolvent company. Generally speaking, this is not the 
way  to  deal  with  the  problem.  Unfortunately,  it  only  benefits  the 
individuals  who  receive  the  assets  before  the  company  is  declared 
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bankrupt or are chosen to purchase the assets at a low price by the 
liquidation  committee.  The  bankrupt  company’s  remaining  creditors 
have to suffer the losses and there is nothing they can do about it.  
Modern bankruptcy laws introduce different forms of reconstruction in 
order to reallocate capital from ineffective companies to more effective 
ones.
147 In Chapter 6, the current 2002 draft contains the opportunity to 
reconstruct the struggling company and to settle outstanding debts with 
the  creditors.  Any  form  of  reconstruction  helps  to  conserve  valuable 
capital to benefit the Chinese and worldwide economy. These assets 
are  supposed  to  be  transferred  to  those  economic  areas  where  the 
degree of positive effects is the highest and the secondary effect is that 
the economy is kept running.
148 The debtor and the creditor both have 
the  opportunity  to  apply  for  reconstruction  if  either  of  them  sees  a 
chance of saving the company.  
The reconstruction plan can be developed with the assistance of the 
management  of  a  company  when  a  bankruptcy  case  is  filed.  These 
managers should know why the company is struggling and has had to 
file for bankruptcy. The experience of reorganisation in other countries 
shows  that  fast  and  direct  action  is  necessary  to  establish  a 
reorganisation plan. In order to save as many of the assets as possible, 
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the management should assist in setting up the reorganisation plan.
149 
The application for reorganisation can be made to the People’s Court 
before or after the bankruptcy case has been declared.
150 In order to 
start reconstruction, the debtor has to develop a reconstruction plan that 
outlines  how  the  turnaround  is  to  be  achieved.  This  plan  has  to  be 
accepted by the creditor’s conference and approved by the court. Other 
countries  are  well-acquainted  with  the  possibility  that  there  may  be 
more than one reconstruction plan. The current draft does not provide 
any opportunity to offer a variety of different plans. The absence of this 




Even  if  the  creditors’  meeting  accepts  or  refuses  the  reconstruction 
plan,  the  decision  still  can  be  overruled  by  the  court.  The  court  will 
overrule the reconstruction plan if it is not convinced by it or the plan 
violates the law.
152 The idea of overruling the creditors’ meeting could 
lead to the suspicion that the court is fulfilling the requirements of the 
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authorities.  However,  an  overruling  can  only  be  carried  out  under 
certain circumstances, which are stated by the bankruptcy law.
153  
Although the law contains regulations which bind the courts, the threat 
will  remain  as  long  as  the  court  system  in  China  is  not  considered 
independent. 
If  the  plan  is  accepted,  there  are  two  possibilities  as  to  how  the 
reconstruction  can  be  implemented.  In  any  case,  the  People’s  Court 
advises the transfer of the company’s property and management affairs 
to the person that will be charged with carrying out the reconstruction.
 
One way of implementing the reorganisation is under self-management 
and supervision of the bankruptcy administrator; the other option is the 
complete  replacement  of  the  management  by  the  bankruptcy 
administrator.
154  If  the debtor  is trying  to  recover  the  company,  he is 
permitted  to  carry  out  normal  business  during  the  period  of 
reconstruction. This includes employing professional staff or deciding 
whether the current staff is to remain in employment or not.
 155  
 
The different effects, along with the side effects of the reorganisation 
system, are very numerous. Besides the minimisation of financial losses 
and  the  potential  risk  of  cascading  bankruptcies,  a  second  very 
important effect should be specified here. In most cases, the company 
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has to reduce staff. The reduction of staff causes unemployment, but if 
a company does not close down completely, there is a good chance of 
saving a large number of jobs.
156  
This “side” effect has to be taken into consideration at all times during 
the  bankruptcy  procedures.  The  chance  of  minimising  the  negative 
effects  of  a  bankruptcy  can  be  increased  if  the  application  for 
bankruptcy is filed as early as possible.  
Compared to the current bankruptcy law, the new bankruptcy law will 
also bring significant changes with respect to the causes of filing for 
bankruptcy. 
 
2.  The Different Causes of Bankruptcy 
 
As a result of the combination of Article 7 and 3, the current bankruptcy 
law defines the cause of bankruptcy as where “the debtor is unable to 
discharge a matured liability” and the enterprise “has incurred serious 
losses due to poor management and administration”.
157 In this thesis, it 
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has already been pointed out that these causes of bankruptcy include at 
least two undefined legal terms which require clarification by the judge. 
In contrast to this vague and undefined reason for declaring a company 
bankrupt,  the  2002  draft  provides  a  general  but  clearer  definition  of 
where to declare a company bankrupt. The first sentence of the draft 
Article 4 states that the company either does not have the amount of 
assets necessary to pay off all liabilities or is unable to repay the debts 
when they are due. In the last sentence of Article 4, the draft contains 
legal fiction. This legal fiction states that a debtor who “ceases” to repay 
the debts due “shall be deemed unable to pay”. This legal fiction could 
lead  to  numerous  litigations.
158  The  draft  does  not  state  whether  the 
cessation of payments has to be permanent or whether a temporary 
cessation fulfils this requirement. Another problem could arise from the 
fact that the application for bankruptcy can be filed without any proof 
that  the  company  is  bankrupt.
159  The  request  for  bankruptcy 
proceedings could prove to be the very reason why a troubled company 
finally collapses, especially if an application for a claim is submitted by 
one of the creditors without any proof of insolvency.  
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Generally  speaking,  the  new  bankruptcy  law  does  not  address  the 
reasons for which a company is unable to pay back its debts on time or 
whether  the  delay  in  payment  is  only  temporary.  This  simplification 
might prove to be a problem.
160  
The debtor has the possibility to arrange a reconstruction plan before 
the  court  declares  the  company  bankrupt.  Even  if  the  parties  have 
agreed to a reorganisation plan, this plan cannot prevent the threat of 
the company finally being declared bankrupt. According to Article 77 of 
the 2002 draft, the court still has the power to declare the company 
bankrupt “upon the request of an interested party”. The draft is not clear 
as to who is considered to be “an interested party” in this context. This 
loophole could offer governmental authorities an opportunity to request 
the termination of a reconstruction plan if they so desire. In addition, 
according  to  Article  89  of  the  2002  draft,  a  judge  has  the  power  to 
declare a company bankrupt if he deems that the reorganisation plan 
does  not  meet  the  bankruptcy  law  regulations.  This  means  that  the 
court can declare a company bankrupt without the request of any party. 
The  court’s  ability  to  do  so  is  contradictory  to  the  general  idea  of  a 
market economy. Should a judge exert this power and force a company 
into bankruptcy, the newly introduced procedures of reconstruction and 
conciliation are annulled.
 161  
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The  responsibilities  and  influences  to  be  obtained  by  the  People’s 
Courts are very extensive and there probably will not be a safe way for 
the creditors to minimise the latent threat of conceivable manipulation 
by the court.  
A further threat can be minimised by the creditors. Under the current 
bankruptcy  regulations,  some  damage  may  have  been  caused  by 
manipulations  by  the  management  of  the  liquidation  committee.  An 
administrator will substitute the personnel of the liquidation committee. 
This administrator will be controlled by the creditors’ meeting.  
 
3.  Management  
 
According  to  Article  25  of  the  2002  draft,  the  People’s  Court  has  to 
appoint an administrator after declaring a company bankrupt. One of 
the  responsibilities  of  this  administrator  is,  according  to  the  first 
sentence  of  Article  25,  the  daily  management  of  the  debtor  and  the 
debtor’s  property.  The  current  system  requires  that  a  liquidation 
committee has to be established under the new bankruptcy law and this 
committee will be replaced by the administrator.
162 The general idea of 
abolishing  the  liquidation  committee  is  to  reduce  the  influence  of 
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governmental officials.
163 Unlike the current system with the liquidation 
committee, there is a good chance that the bankruptcy administrator will 
not  be  directly  connected  to  the  government.  The  administrator  is 
introduced in the draft as an independent third-party. His independence 
is supposed to make the management of bankruptcies more convincing 
and transparent.
164 To reinforce the image of an independent third-party, 
Article 27 states several circumstances which disqualify an individual 
from becoming a bankruptcy administrator. The stipulations help create 
a  legal  environment  which  should  generate  confidence  in  all  parties. 
According to the draft, it is, for example, impossible for a person with a 
criminal  record  or  interests  in  the  particular  bankruptcy  case  to  be 
appointed as the bankruptcy administrator.
165 Another improvement to 
the current system is the requirement of professional experience on the 
part of the administrator. The draft states who can be appointed as an 
administrator in Article 27. This means that the appointed administrator 
should be an individual with experience of business and legal matters.
166 
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According  to  the  article,  the  court  shall  appoint  as  administrator  a 
lawyer,  an  accounting  specialist,  or  a  relevant  social  intermediary 
institution,  which  has  the  necessary  experience,  knowledge  and  has 
passed a qualification examination.
167 As the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress has not yet passed the bankruptcy law, this 
discussion is by no means over and will probably resurface after the law 
has been adopted. At this stage, it is not entirely clear how some of 
these qualifications can be proven. In the forthcoming discussion, the 
“relevant  social  intermediary  institution”,  level  of  experience  and 
examinations will have to be defined.
168  
Irrespective of what qualifications the administrator is required to have, 
no one will be able to carry out the administrator’s duties unless the law 
provides power for this position. In order to safeguard the management 
of the administrators appointed, the new bankruptcy law contains some 
instruments to enable the administrator to establish his management. 
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For example, the administrator has the option of requesting legal action 
from  the  People’s  Court  if  the  debtor  refuses  to  provide  access  to 
accounts, documents and data, or destroys evidence. Legal action can 
be taken against those directly responsible.
169  
The  bankruptcy  administrator  has  a  duty  to  analyse  any  transaction 
made by the former management of the company prior to bankruptcy. 
Under  the  current  law,  there  is  a  good  opportunity  for  company 
managers to draw up a well-planned strategy to apply for bankruptcy. 
After a six-month period, the liquidation committee has no chance to do 
anything  about  these  transactions.
170  Although  the  special  economic 
zone of Shenzhen has one of the modified regional bankruptcy laws, 
some  fraudulent  bankruptcy  cases  have  reportedly  occurred.  The 
general strategy in these cases was to end the companies’ operations 
without liquidation or formal dissolution. The current bankruptcy system 
allows  companies  to  transfer  assets  to  avoid  paying  the  creditors.
171 
Sometimes, the managers of these companies leave nothing behind. 
Consequently,  these  companies  have  been  referred  to  as  “three  no 
companies”. The  courts  and authorities  were faced  with  the  problem 
that  there  was  a  bankrupt  company  without  any  assets,  accounts  or 
business location.
 If these procedures were carried out under the new 
bankruptcy  law,  the  bankruptcy  administrator  would  face  the  same 
problem.  The  change  in  the  legal  system  cannot  prevent  such  well-
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planned  forms  of  fraudulent  bankruptcy.  The  changes  in  the  legal 
system might be helpful in such cases in the brief period between the 
submission  of  the  bankruptcy  petition  and  the  appointment  of  the 
liquidation committee.
172  
To  avoid  the  effects  of  some  of  these  fraudulent  transactions,  the 
bankruptcy  administrator  is  entitled  to  rescind  a  variety  of  the 
transactions. The periods where these actions can be requested vary 
according to the different forms of transaction and can be extended by 
the  People’s  Court  upon  the  request  of  the  administrator.
173  The 
maximum period for this request is one year prior to the submission of 
the bankruptcy petition. The administrator can request the repayment of 
money paid for undue debts, the retransfer of assets which have been 
transferred in a non-sensical deal or request the repayment of money 
paid to non-secured creditors.
174 In addition to this, the draft includes 
regulations  that  recommend  civil,  administrative  and  criminal  liability 
against the former managers of companies. If there is a suspicion that 
the  bankruptcy  was  arranged  by  the  former  managers  or  that  gross 
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negligence caused the bankruptcy, further action can be taken.
175 If one 
of  the  parties  involved  believes  that  the  bankruptcy  administrator  is 
doing  a  poor  job,  they  can  appeal  to  the  People’s  Court  for  further 
action.  This  includes  the  threat  of  an  administrator  taking  over  any 
discriminating  or  fraudulent  decisions.  The  important  message  in  all 
these  changes  is  that  everybody,  including  the  bankruptcy 
administrator, is responsible for his own performance.  
The  reduction  of  interdependencies  between  the  bankruptcy 
management and government officials combined with the possibility of 
holding  the  bankruptcy  administrator  liable  will  hopefully  change  the 
way in which these decisions are scrutinised by the courts.
176  
Chinese and foreign creditors will be able to join the creditors’ meetings 
and will have the opportunity to control the administrator or even claim 
back  damages  and  losses  generated  by  unsatisfactory  work  or 
fraudulent activities on the part of an administrator.  
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4.  The Creditors’ Meeting 
 
Under the current law, the liquidation committee has a wide range of 
duties. Some of the duties and responsibilities will be adopted by the 
bankruptcy administrator. The liquidation committee has a duty to carry 
out the liquidation under the current bankruptcy laws and is basically in 
control  of  the  liquidation  process.
177  In  order  to  create  an  efficient 
supervisory body, the new bankruptcy law will reinforce the position of 
the  creditors´  meeting.  In  contrast  to  its  limited  authority  under  the 
current  bankruptcy  law,  the  modified  creditors´  meeting  will  have  a 
wider scope of authorisation under the new law.  
An important part of the creditors´ meeting authority is the control of the 
bankruptcy  administrator.  This  function  is  one  of  the  several  duties 
which will be carried out by the creditors´ meeting. Article 56 provides 
an  enumeration  of  the  creditors´  meeting’s  full  range  of  duties, 
responsibilities  and  powers.  If  the  creditors´  meeting  is  aware  of 
mismanagement or fraudulent behaviour on the part of the administrator 
or is generally displeased with his nomination, there is the possibility of 
replacing the administrator. In the end, it is a question of democratic 
voting and the majority of creditors decide who will be the administrator 
of the bankrupt company.  
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The creditors´ meeting seems to command a very powerful position but 
certain loopholes in the draft demonstrate how difficulties can arise. The 
power of the creditors´ meeting can be overruled by the People’s Court, 
as previously pointed out in the section discussing the administrator.  
Nevertheless,  the  new  bankruptcy  law  has  the  advantage  that  the 
evaluation  of  the  assets  no  longer  falls  under  the  control  of  the 
governmental  officials.  This  is  very  important  for  the  liquidation 
procedure as there will be a greater chance of recovering the assets’ 
real  value  at  a  free  auction.  In  addition,  the  possibility  of  fraudulent 
asset  deals  will  be  minimised  by  the  control  through  the  creditors´ 
meeting. This will abolish the current practice of selling assets below 
their actual value after bankruptcy has been declared.
178  
In addition to the greater likelihood of recovering debts, creditors can 
always  be  confident  that  decisions  are  discussed  by  the  creditors´ 
meeting.  This  fact  erases  the  current  risk  of  fraudulent  cooperation 
between the governmental authorities and the liquidation committees.  
The creditors´ meeting will become increasingly important as the non-
Chinese creditors realise that a new instrument has been introduced in 
China  that  creates  a  better  chance  of  recovering  debts  in  so-called 
cross-border insolvencies. 
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5.  Cross-border Insolvencies 
 
Generally  speaking,  all  bankruptcy  cases  that  have  an  effect  upon 
assets outside a country can be considered as cross-border insolvency. 
This would, for example, include any bankruptcy case that concerns a 
bankrupt  Chinese  company  which  has  assets  abroad  or  a  bankrupt 
non-Chinese company with assets in China.
179  
Under the current laws, there is hardly any regulation that guides the 
judges  on  how  they  should  address  the  problem  of  cross-border 
insolvencies.
180 For example, the Beijing Municipal Government has set 
up  cross-border  regulations  for  Beijing  that  deal  with  this  topic.
181 
Besides  this,  only  a  few  countries  have  signed  a  bilateral  judicial 
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assistance treaty with China so there is at least a small chance that 
some foreign rulings will be recognized by the Chinese courts.
182  
For  example,  if  a  Chinese  company  were  declared  bankrupt,  the 
Chinese court would claim that any of the company’s assets fall under 
the  control  of  the  Chinese  liquidation  committee.  The  court  would 
demand  control  of  these  assets,  regardless  of  whether  that  asset  is 
abroad  or  not.  In  the  latter  case,  Chinese courts  would  claim  that  a 
second bankruptcy needed to be filed in China and that all assets that 
were located in China needed to be liquidated under the control of the 
Chinese liquidation committee.
183  
Foreign  bankruptcy  administrators  have  to  be  very  creative  and  use 
unconventional methods to retain control of bankrupt company’s assets 
within  China’s  territory.
184  A  foreign  ruling  would  especially  not  be 
recognised  if  it  could  affect  state  sovereignty,  security  and/or  public 
policy.
185  This  Chinese  practise  would  force,  for  example,  lawyers  to 
advise  non-Chinese  bankruptcy  administrators  to  negotiate  with  the 
board of directors of the Chinese subsidiary in question. The aim of the 
negotiation  is  to  retain  control  of  the  assets  and  protect  them  from 
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liquidation by the liquidation committee.
186 Consequently, there is still a 
good  chance  that  the  foreign  bankruptcy  administrator  could  keep 
control of the Chinese assets without involving the Chinese courts.  
In addition, Chinese practise led to a system where misguided Chinese 
debtors  would  transfer  their  assets  back  to  China  instead  of  filing  a 
bankruptcy  case  abroad.
187  This  behaviour  was  purely  driven  by  the 
idea of safeguarding these assets. In return, foreign debtors tried the 
same in order to protect their assets against the Chinese undeveloped 
bankruptcy law and the threat of a Chinese liquidation committee that is 
focused only on regional interests.  
Cases such as that described in the China Daily on 14 March 2002 in 
which  foreigners  were  not allowed  to enter  a  “public  auction”  do  not 
improve  the  image  of  the  legal  system.
188  How  the  bankruptcy 
proceedings are carried out is very important to foreign investors. The 
current regulations do not offer any advice on how judges should deal 
with cross border bankruptcies, so foreign investors feel uncomfortable 
with  the  situation.
189  In  earlier  drafts,  the  topic  of  cross-border 
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bankruptcies was not considered extensively. Researchers demanded 
changes to the bankruptcy draft in order to clarify this topic.
190 The 2002 
draft is changing this strictly territory-related practise and now provides 
universal  procedures  that  are  compatible  with  most  other  modern 
bankruptcy laws.
191  
The new draft demands that a foreign ruling be submitted and approved 
in order to retain control of the assets. As a result, the new law has a 
clear regulation on how to deal with cross-border bankruptcies on the 
one hand but, on the other hand, there is still the possibility that the 
judge may refuse the submission.
192 As a result of this, there might still 
be the risk of a debtor trying to withhold the assets from the creditor by 
an assets transfer. The creditors have to face this risk under the current 
law and it will not be eradicated totally by the draft bankruptcy law. The 
possibility that a judge might refuse to accept a foreign court decision 
might lead to the unequal treatment of creditors and debtors inside and 
outside of China.
193  
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In an additional area, the draft improves the insufficiency of the current 
bankruptcy laws. The current laws do not contain a detailed regulation 
dealing  with  the  possibility  of  contracts  terminated  by  the  bankrupt 
company. The 2002 draft introduces specific regulations which allow the 
administrator to decide whether he wants to terminate certain contracts.  
 
6.  Termination of Contracts 
 
Under the current law, the liquidation committee has the opportunity to 
decide whether a contract may be terminated or continued.
194 According 
to Article 127 of the 2002 draft, this power is granted to the appointed 
administrator. The other party will have the right to set a time limit for 
the  manager  to  make  a  decision  as  to  whether  the  contract  will  be 
fulfilled  or  not.
195  This  regulation  is  an  improvement  on  the  current 
bankruptcy proceedings.  
The decision as to whether a contract is terminated or not is entirely up 
to the appointed administrator
196. The other contracting party is unable 
to  minimise  that  risk  without  setting  an  ultimatum  for  the  manager’s 
decision. In the following chapter, this risk will be considered from the 
particular perspective of contracts on intellectual property rights. In this 
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context, possible solutions to this problem will be discussed, as well as 
how this problem can be avoided.  
 
D  Intellectual Property and Bankruptcy Law 
 
There does not seem to be a direct link between intellectual property 
rights  and  bankruptcy  law  at  first  sight.  Browsing  through  current 
literature, one gets the impression that most of the experts consider this 
a  special  topic.  There  hardly  seems  to  be  an  interdisciplinary  link 
between these subjects and, as a result, hardly any research has been 
carried  out  on  the  effects  of  bankruptcy  laws  on  intellectual property 
rights. When an author discusses the topic of a link between intellectual 
property law and bankruptcy laws, the contribution only deals with small 
aspects of this broad field and generally the focus is either the problems 
of intellectual property rights or the problems of bankruptcy laws.
197  
In  order  to  outline  a  link  between  these  two  topics,  the  accounting 
aspect of intellectual property rights and licenses should be taken into 
consideration.  Looking  at  Chinese  accounting  standards  makes  a 
possible link very obvious.  
Approaching  intellectual  property  or  licences  from  an  accounting 
perspective, these rights are assets. To be precise, they have to be 
considered  as  intangible  assets.  Under  proper  accountancy  rules, 
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intangible  assets  have  to  be  recorded  in  the  companies  accounting 
documents.  
As  mentioned  earlier  in  this  thesis,  the  current  Chinese  accounting 
system does not meet the general international standard required by 
the  countries  of  the  European  Union  and  elsewhere.  The  European 
Union is not willing to accept China as a market economy because of 
several  shortfalls  in  the  Chinese  accounting  standards  and  various 
other  issues.
198  Although  there  are  certain  shortfalls  in  China’s 
accounting standards, the procedure of filing intangible assets in the 
company  books  is  recognised  under  the  current  Chinese  accounting 
system and is at least established in some Chinese accounting laws. 
For example, Chapter 7 of the Accounting Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment deals with 
“Intangible and other Assets”.  
Article 36 of the regulation states in sentence one:  
 
“Intangible  assets  of  enterprises  with  foreign  investment  include 
patents,  proprietary  technology,  patents  and  trademarks,  land 
occupancy  rights  and  other  intangible  assets,  and  shall  be 
accounted for separately and separately disclosed in the balance 
sheet.”  
 
With  this  in  mind,  a  brief  examination  of  the  different  Chinese 
bankruptcy laws will highlight the link between the different bankruptcy 
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laws and intellectual property rights. Although the different bankruptcy 
laws are not very consistent in their definitions of the terms, the analysis 
of these laws will outline the connection. 
In order to highlight the link, firstly the 1986 Trial Implementation of the 
Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy should 
be examined. This law does not provide any details as to which specific 
assets belong to the bankrupt company.  
 
The trial law states in Chapter VI, Article 28:  
Bankruptcy property is made up of the following property: 
(1) all property managed and administered by the bankrupt 
enterprise at the time of the bankruptcy declaration 
(2) property obtained by the bankrupt enterprise between the time 
of the bankruptcy declaration and the end of bankruptcy 
proceedings 
(3) other property rights over which the bankrupt enterprise 
exercises authority 
Property already classed as a security is not part of the bankruptcy 
property. Should the value of the security be in excess of the 
amount of the claim for which it is a security, the amount in excess 
will be taken as part of the bankruptcy property 
 
To give an example of the regional bankruptcy laws, a second glance 
shall  be  taken  at  the  Bankruptcy  Regulations  of  Shenzhen  Special 
Economic  Zone  on  Companies  with  Foreign  Investment.  This  law 83 
declares in Chapter VI, Section 2 which assets belong to the bankrupt 
company. Article 31 states:  
”Bankruptcy assets include: 
(1) Property belonging to the bankrupt company at the time when 
the company is declared bankrupt; 
(2) Other property rights that are within the purview of and shall be 
exercised by the bankrupt company; and  
(3)  Property  recovered  by  the  bankrupt  company  in  accordance 
with Article 11 of the present regulations.” 
 
According to the trial implementation of the 1986 Bankruptcy law, only 
property rights belong to the bankrupt company. Examining the legal 
term  “property  rights”,  there  could  be  a  loophole  for  claiming  that 
licences are not property rights in a legal sense. This argument could 
be supported by the idea that the licensor is the owner of the patent and 
the licensee only has a right to use foreign property. 
In the chosen example of the regional bankruptcy laws, the bankruptcy 
regulations of the Shenzhen special economic zone on companies with 
foreign  investment,  at  least  a  clear  definition  of  what  comprises  the 
bankruptcy  assets  is  given.  Even  a  close  examination  of  this  more 
specific  regulation  does  not  clarify  what  belongs  to  the  bankrupt 
company.  It  could  still  be  argued  that  the  licences  for  intellectual 
property do not belong to the company’s property. This uncertainty will 
change  under  the  new  bankruptcy  law.  The  2002  draft  of  the  new 
bankruptcy law clarifies this point. The interaction of Article 23 and 134 
does not leave any room for argument. Article 23 states:  84 
 
All the property and property rights that belong to the debtor at the 
time when the bankruptcy case is accepted and the property and 
property  rights  the  debtor  obtains  after  the  acceptance  of  the 
bankruptcy  case  but  before  the  termination  of  the  bankruptcy 
procedures, shall be the debtor’s property. Where laws stipulate 
special provisions on the debtor’s property, the special provisions 
shall apply. 
 
The clarification results from Article 134 that states:  
Bankruptcy  property  shall  be  sold  off  through  auction  unless 
otherwise  provided  by  resolutions  of  the  creditors’  meeting. 
Complete sets of equipment in the bankruptcy property shall be 
sold as a whole, and that which cannot be sold as a whole may be 
sold  in  parts.  The  bankrupt  enterprise  may  be  sold  either  as  a 
whole or in parts. Intangible assets and other assets may be sold 
separately in the lat(t)er case. 
 
Intangible assets are stated clearly here and, furthermore, the draft sets 
out  a  clear  procedure  as  to  what  should  happen  to  these  assets. 
Looking  back  at  the  accounting  standards,  it  is  obvious  that  all  the 
intangible assets that have to be filed in the companies balance sheets 
belong to the assets of the bankrupt company and consequently come 
under the management of the bankruptcy administrator. Tangible and 
intangible  assets  will  be  treated  in  a  similar  way  under  the  new 
bankruptcy law. Although all assets will be treated similarly, there will 85 
still  be  various  different  varieties  and  features.  The  next  section  will 
analyse some of the most interesting varieties.  
Several changes have been made in the economic and legal systems of 
China.  However,  a  variety  of  different  features  remain  in  the  legal 
system.  Nevertheless  China  is  trying  to  create  the  required  legal 
standards e.g. in the field of intellectual property laws and bankruptcy 
laws in order to become a market economy. But all these circumstances 
create  a  climate  for  investors  or  creditors  that  can  easily  generate 
multiple difficulties and financial damages.  
The following  sections  will  provide  a  short  overview  of  the  issues  of 
intellectual  property  rights  and  the  transfer  of  technology,  which  are 
necessary  to  demonstrate  the potential  risks  that  are  created  by  the 
new  bankruptcy  law’s  application  to  intellectual  property  rights.  An 
example of how this threat could easily become a practical problem will 
demonstrate the potential worldwide effects. The example will be given 
at the end of this chapter and will consider some additional interactions 
on this topic.  
The protection and transfer of intellectual property rights or technology 
in China is a widely discussed topic. The next section will not examine 
this topic in great depth and will only provide some general information 
concerning the transfer of intellectual property rights. 86 
 
1.  Transfer of Intellectual Property Rights  
 
From a historical point of view, Chinese legislation for the protection of 
intellectual property focussed on civil law and not on criminal law. After 
China  entered  the  WTO,  the  laws  for  the  protection  of  intellectual 
property were changed very rapidly.
199 These changes can be attributed 
to  China’s  WTO  entry  and  its  attempt  to  fulfil  the  WTO  standards. 
Although China has made considerable changes, the TRIPS agreement 
has not yet been fulfilled in its entirety.
200 This could especially be a 
problem for those investors who are willing to invest their intellectual 
property in China. China has to accept that time is a very important 
factor in the investment of intellectual property. The effects of delays 
become  very  obvious  if  it  is  taken  into  consideration  that  intellectual 
property is very short-lived and has to exploit the short period in which it 
gives the owner an advantage over competitors.
201  
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The definition of “intellectual property” varies in the literature.
202 For the 
purpose  of  this  thesis,  intellectual  property  includes  trademarks, 
patents, trade secrets and copyrights. The international importance of 
these  intellectual  property  rights  is  widely  recognised.  However,  the 
official  recognition  of  intellectual  property  rights  is  one  thing  but  the 
effective protection of these rights is an entirely different issue. In this 
context,  one  comment  from  Chin-Ning  Chu  -  a  specialist  in  Asian 
culture studies - is particularly interesting. She is of the opinion that: “It 
is not that they (Asians) do not recognise the intellectual property rights 
of others, it is just that they sometimes choose to ignore them.”
203 As 
China is an Asian country, this seems to apply to China as well.  
In  the  past,  the  term  “technology  transfer”  was  associated  with  the 
transfer  of  equipment  to  China.  This  practice  has  changed  in  recent 
years.
204  The  People’s  Republic  of  China  has  improved  its  legal 
protection of intellectual property. Nevertheless, the Chinese partners of 
foreign  companies  on  the  one  hand  display  the  general  intention  of 
acquiring as much technology as possible but appear to ignore the legal 
implementation of intellectual property protection on the other.
205  
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China’s  is  one  of  the  biggest  and  fastest  growing  economies  in  the 
world and its appetite for new technology is immense. Like companies 
in  most  other  countries,  Chinese  companies  have  recognised  the 
importance of intellectual property and technical know-how.
206 In order 
to obtain an increasingly high standard of technology, China is luring 
foreign companies with the possibility of low-cost production and other 
financial  advantages.
207  In  order  to  seize  the  opportunities  on  the 
Chinese  market,  which  are  offered  to  all  kinds  of  companies,  non-
Chinese  companies  are  more  than  happy  to  succumb  to  that 
temptation. The vehicle used by foreign companies as an effective way 
of  investing  their  capital  and  technology  in  China  used  to  be  the 
company  form  joint  venture.
208  However,  recently  the  possibility  of 
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises has become a viable alternative to 
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joint ventures as an increasing number of economic areas are opened 
to Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises.
209  
There are different ways of transferring intellectual property to China 
and  these  technology  transfer  agreements  can  take  many  different 
forms.
210 In the early stages of technology transfer contracts to China, it 
was usual to transfer intellectual property either by giving the intellectual 
property as a contribution to the investment in a joint venture or by a 
licence  agreement.
211  In  the  case  of  joint  ventures,  there  is  the 
possibility  of  having  technical  exchange  and  cross-licensing,  co-
production  and  marketing  agreements,  joint  product  development 
programs, to name but a few alternatives of investment.
212 
The  different  cultural  interpretations  for  a  written  agreement  can 
become  a  very  serious  problem.  Cultures  like  the  American  or 
European,  which  try  to  state  everything  of  importance  within  the 
different  contracts,  have  to  understand  that  the  Chinese  culture  and 
understanding  of  written  agreements  is  different.
213  The  Chinese 
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understanding and philosophy of a written contract is not binding. For 
the Chinese, it is the beginning of an understanding. Due to Chinese 
interpretation, the strategy of Chinese business partners is to negotiate 
a contract with the aim of achieving as little transparency as possible.
214 
Consequently, most non- Chinese managers must be aware of the risk 
which business in China entails. 
In order to minimise the risk of disclosure, the transfer of technology 
should always be carried out in the form of a written agreement and the 
technology agreement should include a nondisclosure clause.
215 Signing 
a  licence  agreement  with  a  Chinese-based  joint  venture  has  a 
characteristic  that  differs  from  the  general  western  understanding  of 
time limited use of technology. If a license agreement expired under the 
former Chinese regulations, the recipient was the owner of the property 
and  the  use  of  the  intellectual  property  was  no  longer  restricted.
216 
Because of this characteristic, many foreign companies opted for the 
alternative  of  transferring  the  technology  as  a  contribution  to  the 
investment.
217 Chinese authorities introduced regulations which limited 
the maximum amount of registered capital that could be contributed by 
foreign investors in the form of intellectual property as the foreigner’s 
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investment in the Chinese company.
218 Generally speaking, blaming the 
foreign companies if they lose their intellectual property seems to be 
common practice in China. Certain lawyers advise their clients against 
transferring intellectual properties to Chinese joint ventures due to the 
fact that the risk of disclosure is very high.
219 Some authors argue that 
the  foreign  companies  should  protect  their  intellectual  property  more 
effectively  and  should  ensure  that  the  corresponding  return  for  the 
intellectual property is granted.  
Different strategies for the protection of the financial and technological 
investments  have  been  developed.
220  The  protection  of  intellectual 
property  could  be  achieved,  for  example,  if  the  foreign  companies 
planned  their  investments  more  effectively.  In  order  to  plan  the 
investment  more  effectively,  the  agreement  should  cover  the  partner 
company, the people and the government functionaries.
221 Another way 
of  protecting  the  intellectual  property  is  to  transfer  the  technology 
gradually. This strategy can be carried out through different forms of 
technology transfer agreements which state that the transfer is to take 
place in different stages or time periods.
222 The main error outlined by 
                                                 
218 Bassolino, F & Tse, J, "Leveraging Technology in the PRC" (1999) 26:1 The China 
Business Review 20, 21 Electronic Proquest (07 March 2005). 
219 Devonshire-Ellis, C, "JV vs WFOE" (2004) 5:2 China Briefing 4, 5 
<http://www.china-briefing.com> (27 March 2005).  
220 Snodey, S R, "Intellectual Property Security in China's Rapidly Expanding 
Commerce" (2004) 5:5 China Briefing 7 f. <http://www.china-briefing.com> (27 March 
2005). 
221 Snodey, S R, "Intellectual Property Security in China's Rapidly Expanding 
Commerce" (2004) 5:5 China Briefing 7 f. <http://www.china-briefing.com> (27 March 
2005). 
222 Bassolino, F & Tse, J, "Leveraging Technology in the PRC" (1999) 26:1 The China 
Business Review 20, 24 Electronic Proquest (07 March 2005);  
Wilson, J & Brennan R, "Market Entry Methods for Western Firms in China" (2003) 15: 
4 Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics 3, 8 Electronic Proquest (27 June 
2005);  
 92 
some  authors  is  the  occurrence  that  the  protection  of  intellectual 
property  is  not  the  primary  goal  of  the  foreign  investors.
223  In  some 
articles, it is evident that the authors suggest the idea of considering the 
companies´ investments of intellectual property as strategic. Strategic 
investment in this sense can be considered as the aim of reducing the 
financial investment by investing the maximum amount of intellectual 
property.
224 Some companies seemed so eager to reduce the financial 
investment that the risk of losing the intellectual property disappeared. 
These  companies  establish  their  business  with  a  high  amount  of 
intangible assets and a high risk of losing the winning margin before the 
managers of the companies even realise the loss. 
In addition to the fear of losing the intellectual property, the owner shall 
always be aware of the risk of the technology being used without any 
authorisation at any time.  
There  are  different  forms  of  agreements  which  can  be  concluded  in 
order to transfer technology. On the one hand, there is the possibility of 
alienating a patent or another right and, on the other hand, there is the 
possibility of issuing a form of licence agreement.
225 Both alternatives 
have  their  advantages  and  disadvantages.  Due  to  the  fact  that  the 
control over intellectual property is usually lost entirely in a case where 
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the owner of intellectual property rights sells them to a Chinese entity, 
this  thesis  will  examine  the  possibility  of  license  agreement  more 
closely.  
In  the  early  stages  of  technology  transfer  to  China,  any  agreement 
aimed  at  technology  transfer  had  to  be  approved  by  a  Chinese 
ministry.
226 This requirement has changed slightly.
227 The requirement of 
the necessary governmental approval has been replaced by a system 
of  general  permission  with  a  few  exclusions.  In  order  to  meet  the 
requirements of these regulations, the investor has to look very closely 
at  the  requirements  and  bear  in  mind  that  there  are  three  different 
groups of technology.
228 
The  Regulations  of  the  People's  Republic  of  China  on  Technology 
Import and Export Administration adopted on 31 October 2001 state in 
Article 5 that the import and export of technology is permitted unless 
other regulations state otherwise. However, in Articles 8 and 31 of the 
regulations,  it  is  stated  that  the  technology  can  not  be  imported  or 
exported due to the fact that they are prohibited or restricted by the 
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catalogue of Articles 16 or 17 of the Foreign Trade Law. For example, 
Article  17  of  the  Foreign  Trade  Law  already  totally  restricts  some 
technology  and  goods,  such  as  the  import  or  export  of  weapons  or 
nuclear technology. Nevertheless, several technologies and goods can 
only be purchased if the authorities have approved the contracts.
229 The 
major problem with the lists of transfer-restricted technology published 
by  ministries  in  China  is  that  they  could  be  altered  without  any 
discussion or legislation process.  
This  restriction  on  technology  transfer  could  become  a  problem  in 
combination with the new bankruptcy law. In the following section, the 
effects of this and other regulations of the new bankruptcy law will be 
explained. The next section will start with the different forms of payment 
for technology transfer agreements. A technology transfer carried out by 
licence agreement can have three different forms of payment. There 
may be a lump-sum, a royalty stream or a combination of both forms.
230 
The licence agreement is a contract in the context of the draft of the 
new  bankruptcy  law.  According  to  Article  127  of  the  2002  draft,  the 
administrator  will  have  the  right  to  decide  what  happens  to  these 
agreements. In any case, the administrator’s decision will have an effect 
on the agreement and the intellectual properties that are affected by it. 
The next section describes some of the effects that can occur on the 
licensor of intellectual property.  
                                                 
229 The catalogue of goods and technologies according to the Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Foreign Trade Law should be published by the relevant Ministry. The author requested 
the MOFTEC in writing to send a copy of that list or at least give the location where 
the catalogue is published but until the day the theses was submitted the ministry did 
not respond.  
230 Bassolino, F & Tse, J, "Leveraging Technology in the PRC" (1999) 26:1 The China 
Business Review 20, 23 Electronic Proquest (07 March 2005). 95 
 
2.  The Effects of Bankruptcy Laws on Intellectual 
Property Rights  
 
In a case where a licensor goes bankrupt, the licensee still has the right 
to use that license.
231 In the case where a Chinese licensee has to file 
for bankruptcy, the appointed administrator of that company generally 
has the right to decide whether the licence agreement will be cancelled 
or severed. This fact is particularly important for the licensor and the 
licensee in patent, trade secret or copyright licenses that can be used 
continuously after the licensor has filed for bankruptcy.
232 For example, 
in the United States, legal protection is provided for a licensee in a case 
where  the  licensor  files  for  bankruptcy.  The  Intellectual  Property 
Licenses  in  Bankruptcy  Act  grants  the  licensee  the  right  to  use  the 
license, even if the bankrupt licensor decides to reject the license. This 
act grants the same protection for trade secrets, inventions, processes, 
designs,  plant  protection,  patent  application,  plant  variety,  authorship 
and mask work.
233 Judging by the existence of this US law, the general 
risk of bankruptcies in relation to licence agreements seems to have 
been recognised.  
According  to  Article  127  of  the  2002  draft,  the  administrator  will 
scrutinise  these  contracts  and  decide  which  solution  is  best.  The 
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administrator has the right to insist on the fulfilment of the agreement or 
even has the possibility of transferring the contract to a third party in 
order to be able to pay back the debts of the company. In this case, the 
owner of the intellectual property is in grave danger of losing it to a 
competitor.  
In addition, the administrator generally has the possibility of recalling 
any  intellectual  property  that  has  been  transferred  to  the  foreign 
investor by an agreement. The administrator has to arraign this transfer 
of  intellectual  property.  This  possibility  is  introduced  in  chapter  3, 
section 3 of the 2002 draft due to the fact that the administrator has the 
right to check the contracts for any contraventions.  
One reason could be a contravention of the catalogue in accordance 
with Articles 16 and 17 of the Foreign Trade Law; another reason might 
be  a  contravention  of  the  catalogue  of  foreign  investment  or  the 
fraudulent or unbalanced transfer of assets.  
In order to minimise the risk of fraudulent or discriminating clauses in 
technology  transfer  agreements,  they  had  to  be  double-checked  by 
governmental  authorities.  Given  that  governmental  approval  is  no 
longer  compulsory  for  many  of  these  agreements,  the  method  of 
payment  is  not  double-checked.  The  principal  aim  of  auditing  the 
license  agreement  was  to  make  sure  that  the  payment  for  the 
technology does not amount to more than the value of the technology.  
The administrator of a bankrupt company now has the power to audit 
these  licence  agreements.  The  evaluation  of  the  value  of  any 
agreement  concerning  intellectual  property  is  now  up  to  the 
administrator  and  the  creditors’  meeting.  If  a  company  is  to  be 97 
reconstructed, there are a variety of options for the administrator in a 
negotiation. On the one hand, there is the threat that the administrator 
could  sell  the  whole  company  and  the  licence  to  a  competitor.  This 
threat  will  raise  the  bid  from  the  licensor  for  the  termination  of  the 
agreement.  On  the  other  hand,  the  threat  of  terminating  a  licence 
agreement could easily raise the bid of a third party, who is extremely 
interested in purchasing the company with this particular license. 
Generally, it is up to the licensor or owner of the intellectual property to 
decide  what  value  a  certain  agreement  has.
234  However,  during 
negotiations in a bankruptcy case, more or less anything can happen. In 
order to reconstruct the company, the administrator might try to reduce 
the  royalty  fee,  call  for  the  financial  support  of  the  licensor  or  for  a 
reduction in the debts the creditor has with the licensor. In the end, it is 
up to the licensor how much he is willing to pay in order to ensure that 
competitors cannot legally gain access the technology. This could prove 
to  be  very  expensive  for  the  owner  of  the  intellectual  property.  For 
example, the bigger the technological advantage, the better the position 
of  the  administrator  in  the  negotiation.  This  notion  is  a  threat  that 
western managers either have not yet detected or are reluctant to talk 
about.  
Generally speaking, this problem could arise in many other countries. 
For example, if a German company is facing the threat of bankruptcy in 
Germany,  the  appointed  bankruptcy  manager  (“Insolvenzverwalter”) 
has  similar  powers  to  his  Chinese  equivalent.  However,  there  are 
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several mechanisms in German bankruptcy law that give the licensor a 
good chance of recovering his intellectual property or at least protecting 
it from a competitor.  
The possibility of a company with a licence being sold to one of the 
owner’s competitors or the owner paying more money than the potential 
purchaser is of great interest to the creditors of the bankrupt company. 
The money received from such a deal will help to reduce the financial 
damage resulting from the company’s bankruptcy. This notion could be 
limited by the bankruptcy law itself. Article 134 of the 2002 draft states:  
Bankruptcy  property  shall  be  sold  off  through  auction  unless 
otherwise provided by resolutions of the creditors’ meeting.  
Complete sets of equipment in the bankruptcy property shall be 
sold as a whole, and that which cannot be sold as a whole may be 
sold in parts.  
The bankrupt enterprise may be sold either as a whole or in parts. 
Intangible assets and other assets may be sold separately in the 
lat(t)er case. 
Bankrupt property that is not allowed to be auctioned or sold in 
public as provided by state laws or regulations shall be disposed of 
as per relevant laws or regulations.  
 
The last two sentences of this article will have an effect in connection 
with the list established by the Foreign Trade Law. As a result of these 
sentences the court will have to evaluate every intangible asset for a 
possible  violation  of  the  Foreign  Trade  Law.  In  the  end,  the 
administrator has a duty to uphold the law. At worst, this means that the 99 
administrator  is  only  allowed  to  sell  the  intellectual  property  to  an 
interested Chinese party at an unreasonable price. This regulation is 
accompanied by the additional danger of losing the technology on the 
part  of  the  owner  of  the  intellectual  property.  The  only  possibility  of 
recovering the technology for the owner could then be achieved by a 
different  Chinese  company  that  meets  the  requirements  of  this 
regulation.  Unless  the  owner  already  has  a  second  company 
established in China that is able to recover the assets, this task may 
prove practically impossible to achieve.  
If  the  Chinese  authorities  are  eager  to  keep  the  intellectual  property 
under Chinese control, the catalogue of technologies and goods that 
are forbidden or restricted from being transferred could be altered very 
easily.  
A similar problem has already occurred under the current bankruptcy 
regulations.  Zhang  and  Booth  report  that  valuable  assets  like  the 
business licence of a bankrupt company has to be returned to the state 
authorities. These assets cannot be sold in order to reduce the debts of 
the creditor.
235  
In  the  case  of  technology  that  is  not  allowed  to  be  transferred  to  a 
foreign-dominated  company  or  a  foreign  investment  company,  this 
could cause financial damage, not to mention the loss of control over 
the  intellectual  property.  All  hopes  of  creditors  receiving  a  higher 
percentage  of  recovery  on  their  debts  due  to  the  amount  of  money 
gained by the purchase of that technology could be dashed. This could 
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easily  happen  if  these  assets  can  only  be  sold  to  a  one-hundred-
percent Chinese-owned company. These companies can purchase the 
assets for less than the true value of the technology because no true 
competitor is able to place an offer. The idea that the creditors’ meeting 
has  to  evaluate  the  value  of  all  assets  will  be  undermined  and  the 
chances of recovering the debts reduced in this case.  
Probably the administrator’s most important task is the repayment of all 
of the bankrupt company’s creditors. In order to complete this task, he 
has the option of carrying out secondary tasks, such as saving jobs. As 
China has not completed the process of amending the social security 
system,  there  is  considerable  pressure  on  the  administrator  to  save 
jobs.  Saving  jobs  could  become  a  bigger  issue  than  repaying  the 
creditors. The risk of social instability was widely discussed during the 
different stages of the drafting process. For example, the social security 
system in other countries, such as Germany, is more developed and, 
consequently, the attention of the administrators is more focused on the 
creditors  than  the  workers.  Although  a  German  bankruptcy 
administrator generally tries to save as many jobs as possible, there is 
not such a big reliance on the existence of a company as there is in 
China  today.  The  result  of  different  social systems  and backgrounds 
means less pressure for the German bankruptcy administrator.  
The problem of unemployment in most countries is both an economic 
question and a political question. Social stability on the one hand and 
political stability on the other are both issues which politicians always 
bear  in  mind,  regardless  of  what  nationality  they  may  be.  The  next 
section gives an example of how intellectual property can be lost due to 101 
the  financial  instability  of  a  company.  This  example  is  taken  from  a 
western country and is not related to China or any other developing 
country.  
 
3.  Practical Appearance 
 
The threat of losing intellectual property due to the financial problems of 
a licensor or an affiliate is seldom mentioned in publications. One of the 
reasons why this problem is hardly addressed could be that the parties 
involved try their best to ensure that nobody is aware of the problem. 
One  prime  example  of  such  a  case  happened  in  2000.  The  parties 
involved  were  the  German  company  “Krauss-Maffei  Wegman”,  the 
Spanish  company  “Santa  Barbara  SA”  and  the  American  Company 
“General Dynamics”.
236 
In  this  particular  case,  the  German  company  owned  patents  and 
licences  for  the  construction  of  the  “Leopard  2”  tank.  In  1999,  the 
Spanish  company  “Santa  Barbara”  purchased  the  right  to  build 
approximately  200  “Leopard  2”  tanks  for  the  Spanish  army.
237 
Unfortunately,  the  state-owned  “Santa  Barbara”  company  suffered 
serious  financial  problems  in  2000.  As  the  major  shareholder,  the 
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Spanish state received an offer from “General Dynamics” to take over 
the  struggling  company.  Usually,  this  would  be  considered  as  a 
“normal” business transaction. However, something made this “normal” 
transaction  very  delicate  indeed.  “General  Dynamics”  is  the 
manufacturer of the “M1 Abrams” tank and therefore one of the major 
competitors of “Krauss-Maffei Wegman”. “Kraus-Maffei Wegman” was 
desperately trying to secure the intellectual property forwarded to that 
Spanish  licensee.  Several  attempts  were  made  to  ensure  that  this 
military  know-how  and  the  licences  were  not  accessible  to  “General 
Dynamics”. In the early stages of the German-Spanish tank deal, the 
German  company  considered  taking  over  the  Spanish  company 
themselves. The licence agreement did not have a restrictive clause for 
a case where “Santa Barbara” was taken over by any other company. 
After “General Dynamics” offered the Spanish government the takeover 
deal, German politicians tried to convince the Spanish government to 
call off the sale and accept the German offer instead. In the end, all 
German  attempts  failed  due  to  the  fact  that  the  offer  by  “General 
Dynamics” was more attractive than that of the German consortium.
238  
A similar scenario could have occurred if “Santa Barbara” had had to 
apply for bankruptcy and an administrator had had to make a decision.  
A  chance  to  secure  1,800  jobs made  the  decision  very  easy  for the 
Spanish government in this case.
  239 A bankruptcy administrator would 
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have  made  the  same  decision  in  order  to  secure  the  company  or 
facilitate a reconstruction.  
Finally,  “Santa  Barbara”  agreed  to  sign  a  contract  that  should 
“safeguard” the German company’s intellectual property and know-how 
by introducing strict contractual penalties should the American company 
gain  access  to  the  German  technology.  This  agreement  and  the 
contractual  penalty  could  only  appease  the  concerns  of  the  German 
managers. If there is a possibility of this know-how being transferred, 
the  German  company  will  have  the  problem  of  proving  how  the 
information reached the competitor. This ultimately poses the question: 
how can anybody be sure that no information is transferred? In the end, 
even if the information itself is not transferred, you still can transfer the 
individuals that have the experience or knowledge to work out a similar 
solution without violation of the ban on technology transfer to a different 
group company.  
The German company was lucky in that at least the agreement was 
signed to protect the intellectual property. If “Santa Barbara” had had to 
file for bankruptcy there would basically have been no chance to sign 
such an agreement with a bankruptcy administrator. The administrator 
would only care about the creditors. If there is no contractual penalty in 
the  licence  agreement  or  any  ban  on  technology  transfer  to  a 
competitor, the administrator only has the option of ensuring that the 
creditors obtain the best return on their outstanding monetary money. 
Even if the administrator would like to offer a comparable agreement, as 
the Spanish government did, he could be held liable for the fact that the 
company’s value would suffer.  104 
This  example  was  not  based  on  a  bankruptcy  case  but  if  “Santa 
Barbara”  had  had  to  file  for  bankruptcy,  the  effect  would  have  been 
worse for the German company.  
It is easy to blame the legal advice of the German company in this case. 
The legal advice of the German company did not introduce a clause into 
the licence agreement to revoke the licenses in the case of a takeover 
by one of its competitors. However, if “Santa Barbara” had had to file for 
bankruptcy, there would have been no chance to revoke the licences. 
The idea of the reconstruction or recovery  of any bankrupt company 
would be abolished by a clause that allows the owner of an intellectual 
property to revoke the licence. China’s new bankruptcy law is very clear 
on  this  point.  Only  the  administrator  has  the  right  to  cancel  the 
agreements. If he has, for example, the opportunity to reconstruct the 
company with the financial support of any of the licensor’s competitors, 
the administrator might choose this option. In this case, the licensor is 
bound by the licence agreement and his competitor has access to all 
information.  
 
The next chapter will summarise the results. This will be followed by 
comments on the results, which will illustrate solutions to the various 
problems.  105 
 
E  Summary 
 
The  case  of  the  Spanish  company  “Santa  Barbara  SA”  and  the 
German-Spanish  tank  deal  with  the  German  company  “Kraus-Maffei 
Wegman” is a prime example of how intellectual property rights could 
be jeopardised by a financial crisis.  
There are several stages in a financial crisis before a company has to 
file  for  bankruptcy.  Usually,  the  chances  recovering  a  company  are 
better the earlier the management tries to adjust business operations. 
Bankruptcy  is  the  final  stage  in  a  financial  crisis  prior  to  liquidation. 
However, if a company can still fashion a turnaround, it always has a 
chance of surviving the crisis.  
 
1.  The Situation in China 
 
As a result of China’s ambition to become a market economy, all market 
forces that influence the rest of the world will affect Chinese economy. 
Chinese  authorities  seem  to  have  accepted  the  urgent  need  for  a 
general bankruptcy law in China. The currently suggested bankruptcy 
law  is  a  significant  step  in  the  right  direction.  As  the  current  draft 
requires several changes or additions, it can only be the first step. The 
drafting process is a good example of how political concerns in China 
influence the legislation process. In addition, the connection between 
political  development  in  China  and  legislation  development  is  very 106 
obvious in the bankruptcy law sector. The Chinese revolution and the 
introduction of the “open window policy” are two of the relevant political 
events  that  have  had  an  influence  on  the  positive  and  negative 
development  in  China.  The  first  incident  abolished  the  existing 
bankruptcy  system  and  the  second  could  be  considered  as  the 
foundation  stone  of  the  bankruptcy  laws  in  the  People’s  Republic  of 
China.  Since  the  bankruptcy  law  was  revitalised  in  China,  several 
amendments  have  been  made.  The  most  recent  development  in 
bankruptcy legislation is the drafting of the new bankruptcy law, which 
has lasted for more than 10 years.
240 Eventually, it will provide China 
with a modern bankruptcy law.
241 
 
2.  A Modern Chinese Bankruptcy Law 
 
The  current  bankruptcy  system,  with  all  its  confusing  or  inconsistent 
regional bankruptcy regulations and the likelihood of policy-orientated 
bankruptcies, will be replaced.
242 One of the improvements implemented 
by  the  new  bankruptcy  law  is  the  change  in  the  application  of  the 
bankruptcy  laws.  According  to  the  drafted  Article  3  of  the  new 
bankruptcy law, it will be applicable to all company forms. The different 
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treatment  of  foreign  investment  companies  and  State-Owned 
Enterprises will finally be abolished. The new law will offer a different 
treatment  as  exceptions  in  the  military,  mining  and  finance  business 
areas.
243 The finance sector in particular is facing some problems due to 
so-called non-performing loans. In order to safeguard private investors, 
certain special regulations will be introduced after the new bankruptcy 
law  becomes  effective.
244  The  special  regulations  could  be  used  to 
prevent cascading effects throughout the country due to the bankruptcy 
of a main creditor.
245 Although special regulations will be implemented, 
this new law will offer China a possibility to improve the legal standards 
and help China approach its goal of recognition as a market economy. 
As an addition to the greater prospect of being recognised as a market 
economy,  these  changes  will  increase  China’s  chances  under  the 
upcoming  Basel  II  rating  regulation  and  create  a  positive  climate  for 
international  investment  in  China.
246  Resulting  from  the  effect  of  the 
Basel  II  agreement,  the  possibility  of  transferring  intangible  assets 
instead of liquid assets will become very important for all parties on the 
different markets.  If  China does  not address  the  shortfalls  in  several 
areas, such as the accounting standards, the bankruptcy laws and the 
intellectual  property  laws,  the  rating  for  any  investment  in  China  will 
become worse. Investors will seek a different location with a lower risk 
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for investment. Investors require information to evaluate the risk of an 
investment. In order to make a reasonable evaluation, there is a need 
for comparable data. Currently, the Chinese statistic system has certain 
shortfalls if it reaches the stage of providing market orientated statistic 
data.  
 
3.  Chinese Bankruptcy Statistics  
 
The  fact  that  “statistically”  speaking  the  number  of  bankruptcies  in 
China  is  rising  continuously  cannot  be  used  as  an  indicator  that  the 
current  bankruptcy  laws  are  working  efficiently.  Chinese  authorities 
have  had  different  approaches  in  dealing  with  the  problem  of 
bankruptcy through the years. Therefore, the fact that the number of 
bankruptcies is rising cannot be considered as a consequence of the 
efficiency  of  the  legal  system.  In  the  early  stages  of  the  problem  of 
financial  difficulties,  the  authorities  tried  to  solve  this  by  pursuing  a 
strategy  of  mergers  or  acquisitions.  Experience  proved  that  this 
alternative was not very helpful. Consequently, the authorities decided 
to admit more bankruptcies.
247 As a result of these variations in strategy, 
it is very difficult to obtain any detailed historical information from the 
Chinese bankruptcy statistics. The situation has improved, but there is 
still a shortfall in the statistics due to the fact that Chinese managers or 
regional authorities have different understandings of how the economic 
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data  should  be  processed.  Foreign  investors  will  not  obtain  the 
necessary  information  from  these  statistics.  Consequently,  the 
information provided by them is basically not very helpful in analysing 
the risks of investment in China. In the forthcoming years, one of the by-
products  of  the  introduction  of  the  new  bankruptcy  law  will  be  the 
possibility that Chinese statistics might paint a more realistic picture of 
bankruptcies  and  insolvencies  in  China.  If  the  changes  in  the 
bankruptcy law are carried out seriously, the significance of Chinese 
statistics  will  be  helpful  for  any  investment  decision.  An  initial  step 
towards more precise statistics will be the reduction of political influence 
on bankruptcy courts and procedures. An improvement in the statistics 
will  not  only  help  the  international  investors,  but  also  the  Chinese 
authorities will have a better overview of what is happening in China. 
The fact that Chinese authorities have no idea as to what is happening 
in the country should be one reason to improve this.
248 A further key 
issue  in  the  current  bankruptcy  law  system  is  the  eradication  of 
governmental influence.  
 
4.  Government Influence  
 
Several  bankruptcies  in  China  that  were  affected  by  governmental 
influences have alerted international investors. The bankruptcy of the 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company in particular 
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gave  international  and  national  investors  a  prime  example  of  how 
Chinese  authorities  can  use  the  current  bankruptcy  laws  and 
regulations. Under the current bankruptcy laws, the courts have been 
influenced by the authorities.
249 It is still highly likely that the danger of 
manipulation by government authorities of bankruptcy proceedings or 
courts still very much exists. This should be kept in mind, even after the 
new bankruptcy law finally takes effect. The elimination of governmental 
influence  on  the  bankruptcy  system  could  be  one  of  the  principle 
objectives of the new bankruptcy law. On the one hand, some of the 
current manipulation potential will be eliminated by the new bankruptcy 
law; on the other hand, however, the new law may well contain several 
loopholes. These newly introduced influences will offer the authorities 
fresh opportunities to manipulate the bankruptcy procedures at different 
stages. There might be a direct manipulation of the proceedings or an 
indirect influence on the courts. In order to avoid the negative effects of 
these loopholes, the new bankruptcy law should either be amended or 
the  judges  should  be  aware  of  the  potential  influence  the authorities 
could have. In view of the history of the Chinese legal system and the 
influence Chinese authorities have enjoyed on the courts in the past, 
the second alternative will not be sufficient enough and the effect of the 
new  bankruptcy  law  could  vanish.  The  possibility  of  governmental 
influence is a loophole that opens up an additional gap for fraudulent 
bankruptcies.  
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5.  Fraudulent Bankruptcy 
 
Nearly  every  bankruptcy  system  has  to  combat  attempts  made  by 
individuals  to  benefit  from  a  company’s  bankruptcy.  Fraudulent 
bankruptcy does not necessarily imply the creation of personal benefit. 
In some variations, the benefit is offered to a third-party. As in other 
countries,  fraudulent  bankruptcy  cases  have  been  reported  under 
China’s current bankruptcy procedure. A prime example of fraudulent 
bankruptcy  activities  is  the  Zhongjiang  Silk  Company  Case.  In  that 
particular bankruptcy case, a political decision forced the company to 
file for bankruptcy.
250 In the end, the creditors had to suffer the financial 
damage of politically motivated bankruptcy. Reducing the influence of 
governmental authorities will reduce the possibility of similar cases. A 
number  of  other  regulations  will  be  implemented  under  the  new 
bankruptcy law that might help to minimise the attempts at fraudulent 
bankruptcies or detect criminal activity.
  
A prime example of such regulations could be the changes in the duties 
of the company’s management. Under the new law, the management of 
a company will have an obligation to submit a bankruptcy petition if the 
requirements  of  a  bankruptcy  are  fulfilled.  This  means  that  if  the 
management fraudulently  withholds  the petition, the  behaviour  of  the 
management can be detected more easily. In order to carry out this 
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task,  the  new  bankruptcy  law  is  improving  the  reason  for  filing  for 
bankruptcy. According to Article 11 in connection with Article 4 of the 
new bankruptcy law, the management of the company will have a clear 
requirement  defining  at  what  stage  a  bankruptcy  petition  is  to  be 
handed in. The courts will then be able to control the management and 
have an opportunity to take action against managers who fraudulently 
withhold a bankruptcy petition. Under the current bankruptcy laws, no 
State-Owned Enterprise can apply for bankruptcy unless the application 
has been approved by the governmental authorities. In addition to this, 
the current bankruptcy law for State-Owned Enterprises includes a very 
vague reason for a bankruptcy petition. Consequently, there is a wide 
scope for the authorities to exercise their influence.
251 If the influence of 
authorities  is  reduced  by  clarifying  the  reasons  for  bankruptcy, 
fraudulent bankruptcies could be reduced and several other side-effects 
could  hopefully  be  registered.  One  side-effect  could  be  that  the 
investors and creditors will be able to predict the full risk of bankruptcy 
for a particular company more easily. Another side-effect could be that 
the  statistics  might  become  more  precise  and  the  investment 
opportunities  for  the  future  could  be  evaluated  more  effectively.  In 
addition  to  these  important  improvements,  some  other  adjustments 
have  been  made  in  the  new  bankruptcy  law.  Foreign  investors  will 
appreciate that the new bankruptcy law is more strongly focusing on 
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protection against losses, abuses or disadvantages and changing the 
protection focus.  
 
6.  Creditor Orientation 
 
The intent of the new Chinese bankruptcy laws is to focus on the needs 
of all creditors. Creditors in this sense are not only the creditors that 
delivered goods to the bankrupt company. According to Article 10 of the 
2002 draft, the court will safeguard the lawful rights and interests of the 
employees. This means that employees of the company who have not 
been paid by their employer are creditors as well. In this sense, the 
administrator has to ensure that he does not discriminate against any of 
the creditors.
252 All creditors who belong to the creditors’ meeting have 
the  right  to  vote  on  different  issues  in  the  bankruptcy  proceedings 
unless  their  credits  have  not  been  confirmed.  This  right  to  make 
decisions on the further proceedings and how the debtor is treated is a 
very important step towards a modern bankruptcy law.  
The  power  of  the  creditors´  meeting  is  limited  by  Article  89.  The 
possibility of limiting the power of the creditors´ meeting is a loophole 
that grants the court and anybody who is able to influence the court 
immense power. This article introduces the right of the court to reject 
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the decision of the creditors´ meeting and could be considered as a 
remnant  of  the  planned  economy.  Although  this  regulation  specifies 
some  vague  premises  in  which  cases  the  court  may  overrule  the 
creditors´  meeting’s  decision,  some  uncertainties  remain  that  might 
have negative effects upon the bankruptcy proceeding. For example, 
the court could overrule the vote of the creditors´ meeting if the court 
regarded  the  decision  as  violating  a  law.  This  regulation  could 
eventually prove to be too broad and could halt the reconstruction of the 
company.  This  negative  effect  could  especially  occur  if  one  of  the 
creditors  thinks  he  has  been  treated  unfairly  and  the  court  could 
terminate the entire reconstruction process.  
 
7.  Reconstruction  
 
In  Articles  17  to  21,  the  1986  trial  bankruptcy  law  introduced  the 
possibility of reorganising a State-Owned Enterprise instead of adopting 
the ultimate alternative of liquidating the company.
253 The law does not 
explain how the reconstruction of the company should be carried out. 
Effectively, the law is not very precise. The current bankruptcy law only 
states  that  the  bankrupt  company  could  try  to  achieve  a  conciliation 
agreement with the creditors´ meeting. As a matter of fact, the likelihood 
that the creditors´ meeting is led by individuals who usually  work as 
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government officials is very high.
254 This means that it is highly likely 
that the liquidation committee will transfer the valuable assets before 
the  creditors´  meeting  has  the  chance  to  make  a  decision  on  the 
alternative  of  a  reconstruction.  After  these  assets  have  been 
transferred, there are usually no valuable assets remaining that could 
be  used  for  the  reconstruction  of  the  company.  Under  these 
circumstances,  a  successful  reconstruction  becomes  very  unlikely. 
Reorganisation  under  the  current  regulation  becomes  even  more 
unlikely if it is taken into consideration that the debtor is not obliged to 
develop an explicit reconstruction plan for the creditors´ meeting. This 
ultimately means the creditors´ meeting would be ignorant as to what 
happens with the creditors after the conciliation agreement has been 
signed.  
The  2002  draft  improves  this  situation  dramatically.  In  Chapter  VI, 
Section 3, the new bankruptcy law states how the reconstruction plan is 
to be set up. Forming a reconstruction plan basically means describing 
how  a  turnaround  can  be  achieved  for  the  company.  The  creditors´ 
meeting should have a detailed picture and be able to make its own 
predictions regarding the chances of the proposed reconstruction. The 
aspect that will be of the greatest interest and probably the deciding 
issue is the creditors´ meetings satisfaction with the expected recovery 
of debts. This method of solving the problem of bankruptcy is similar to 
the bankruptcy laws of other nations. Unfortunately, the Chinese model 
will introduce Article 89. This article has already been detected as a 
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potential  risk  factor  for  the  bankruptcy  procedure  and  the  potential 
overruling of the creditor’s meeting decision could easily prove to be the 
biggest  loophole  in  the  new  bankruptcy  law.  The  fact  that  Article  77 
allows  any  “interested  party”  to  request  the  termination  of  the 
reconstruction will make this one of the most powerful regulations for 
anyone  who  is  trying  to  influence  the  bankruptcy  procedures.  An 
interested party in this sense is not clarified. In addition to the debtor 
and the creditors, governmental authorities or even the court itself could 
be  considered  as  an  “interested  party”.  It  is  essential  for  the  new 
bankruptcy law to clarify who is allowed to request the termination of a 
reconstruction plan. Social and political stability will increase if the new 
bankruptcy  law  provides  a  clear  answer  to  the  question  as  to  which 
parties are permitted to influence the bankruptcy proceedings. The new 
bankruptcy law introduces many changes that will bring stability to the 
entire  economy.  One  of  these  changes  is  clarification  concerning 
intellectual property rights.  
 
8.  Intellectual property rights 
 
The  connection  between  bankruptcy  laws  and  intellectual  property 
rights  is  not  very  obvious  under  the  current  law.  The  fact  that  the 
bankruptcy laws and regulation are not very clear about the fact that 
intellectual  property  rights  are  assets,  which  belong  to  the  bankrupt 
company,  supports  this  impression.  To  outline  a  link  between  both 
areas of law, it is necessary to examine the topic from a different angle. 117 
A connection can be manifested if the accounting standards are taken 
in  consideration.  Looking  at  the  current  bankruptcy  laws  from  an 
accounting point of view helps identify a link between the bankruptcy 
laws  and  intellectual  property  rights.  However,  the  laws  are  so  non-
specific that there are still some details that might be worth discussing. 
A link will be clarified after the new bankruptcy law becomes effective. 
In Article 134 of the 2002 draft, it is very clearly stated that intangible 
assets  belong  to the company’s  assets. According  to  the  accounting 
standards,  intellectual  property  rights  are  intangible  assets.  This 
regulation  includes  patents,  licenses  or  knowledge  contracts.  Due  to 
this clarification, the link between both areas of law should now be very 
clear. This clarification of the bankruptcy law will have effects on the 
intellectual  property  rights  and  a  significant  impact  on  the  Chinese 
economy. The fact that the new bankruptcy law clarifies the status of 
licences and patents within a bankruptcy should attract the attention of 
managers all over the world who are dealing with China and intellectual 
property rights. The penultimate sentence of Article 134 will particularly 
be a danger for the owner of intellectual property rights. According to 
this regulation, intangible assets cannot be sold in the same way as 
tangible assets. This different treatment seems necessary according to 
the  last  sentence  of  Article  134.  The  regulation  states  that  all 
regulations  prohibiting  the  purchase  of  certain  property  at  a  public 
auction have to be kept in mind. At least one of the relevant regulations 
could be the catalogue of goods and technologies which are restricted 
by Articles 17 and 18 of the foreign trade law. The problem with this 
catalogue  is  that  the  authorities  could  easily  alter  the  catalogue  or 118 
regulation without any discussion or legislation process. This fact is a 
very high risk for a variety of individuals. One of the individuals affected 
is the administrator.  
The  administrator  always  has  to  watch  very  carefully  to  whom  he  is 
selling the intangible assets of a bankrupt company or whether he is 
generally entitled to sell a company to a foreign investor.  
This  is  one of two  potential  scenarios  that might  occur  in  relation  to 
bankruptcy  laws  and  intellectual  property  rights.  The  investor  of 
intellectual properties has to consider this regulation. He has to bear in 
mind the fact that he might not be allowed to take over the company in 
which he invested his intellectual property rights. Furthermore, he may 
not be allowed to repurchase the intellectual property rights. 
A different scenario in this context could easily emerge if the bankrupt 
company is transferred to a competitor of the intellectual property rights 
owner. A similar scenario has been described in the examination of the 
example of the Spanish “Santa Barbara” company. In this context, the 
investor  of  intellectual  property  has  to  consider  that  a  repatriation  of 
intellectual property rights might be counter-productive to the successful 
reconstruction of the bankrupt company. Because of this, a court might 
consider this repatriation as impossible or invalid. International investors 
will have to clarify whether their licence agreements have to be adjusted 
or  whether  there  is  no  chance  of  modifying  this  form  of  technology 
transfer.  In  the  future,  several  other  threats  that  have  not  been 
discussed in this thesis may arise.  119 
 
F  Conclusion 
 
This  thesis  provides  an  insight  into  problems  that  might  occur  for 
investors of intellectual property in China and for creditors of bankrupt 
Chinese companies, which hope to benefit from the fact that a bankrupt 
Chinese company has intangible assets. China’s new bankruptcy law 
explicitly  states  that  intangible  assets  are  included  in  the  debtor’s 
assets. At face value, this clarification is an improvement on the current 
bankruptcy law. At a second glance, creditors might have several ideas 
in  connection  with  development  that  probably  will  not  be  fulfilled. 
Furthermore, some of these changes will raise concerns on the part of 
intellectual property owners.  
 
Intangible assets are very important for the Chinese economy and they 
will  become  increasingly  important  in  the  future.  The  technical 
development  of  China  and  the  financial  developments  according  to 
Basel II are two of the reasons for this trend. Companies that are willing 
to invest in China will have to be very careful in the way they act and 
deal  with  Chinese  companies.  The  due  diligence  in  contractual 
negotiations  and  the  written  agreement  will  become  increasingly 
important. This thesis illustrates that every manager or legal advisor has 
to be aware of the fact that there is at least more than one way to lose 
intellectual property. Violation of patents or licences is a common and 
well-known way to lose control over intellectual property rights. For the 120 
owner of intellectual property, the loss of that property could become 
even  worse  in  the  case  of  a  bankruptcy.  The  possibility  that  a 
competitor could be able to gain lawful access to licensed or restricted 
knowledge has to be taken in consideration in any investment plans in 
China.  
The  owners  of  intellectual  property  will  now  have  to  consider  the 
financial  situation  of  a  licensee  very  carefully  and  consider  an  exit 
strategy.  This exit  strategy  should be  able  to  recover  the  knowledge 
right  at  the  beginning  of  a  financial  crisis.  The  fact  that  the 
reconstruction  of  a  bankrupt  company  is  becoming  more  and  more 
likely in China makes it, amongst other things, important for the owner 
of  intellectual  property  rights  to  monitor  the  companies  that  hold 
licenses.  
In the end, the investors have to decide which strategy is appropriate. 
The  example  of  the  Spanish  company  “Santa  Barbara”  perfectly 
describes the problem that can arise if a considered takeover fails and a 
competitor  places  a  better  offer.  In  order  to  avoid  this  scenario,  the 
monitoring carried out by the licensor has to be able to detect a financial 
crisis before the company fulfils the criteria to apply for bankruptcy. This 
monitoring requires a well-developed accounting standard so changes 
in  the  Chinese  accounting  regulation  are  necessary  to  monitor  the 
development of a particular company. Risk management and financial 
forecasts will be some of the tools that will help to safeguard intellectual 
property. 
At worst, the owners of intellectual property have to make up their mind 
as to which alternative to pursue. The owner of intellectual property can 121 
always try to outbid a competitor if there is a threat that a company 
could be taken over by a competitor. Looking at the current situation in 
China, there are still a few uncertain possibilities that could frustrate this 
plan. In any case, there is still the possibility that the administrator will 
think that the competitor has the better opportunity in the case of a take 
over. Even if the administrator wants to transfer the company to the 
owner  of  the  intellectual  property  rights,  a  further  obvious  possibility 
might occur.  
If the technology is very valuable to the Chinese authorities and they 
decide to protect the special technology, they could, in order to achieve 
that goal, be tempted to change the technology transfer regulations or 
the catalogue of goods and technologies referring to the foreign trade 
law. After these changes have been implemented, no foreigner would 
be allowed to receive that particular technology. As these regulations or 
catalogues are not bound by legislative processes, the changes can be 
carried  out  quickly  and  unbureaucratically.  Recently,  the  practice  of 
protecting Chinese industry by changing regulations has already been 
reported in other economic areas.
255 
The  more  advanced  a  technology  or  intellectual  property  is  to  the 
owner, the better the supervision and risk management that needs to be 
taken.  
China is on the right track to improving the legal framework and thus to 
being  recognised  as  a  market  economy.  Introducing  the  drafted 
bankruptcy  law  can  only  be  a  step  in  the  right  direction  towards 
                                                 
255 Gärtner, M, "Zwischen Turbo-Kapitalismus und Planwirtschaft - Die Schwächen 
des Standorts liegen vor allem in der Machtfülle des Staates" (2004) <http://www.nrw-
export.de/export/2113.asp> (07 April 2005). 122 
establishing a modern bankruptcy law in China. The standard of this 
modern  law  will  become  comparable  to  most  of  the  international 
bankruptcy laws. However, unless China reinforces the independence 
of the courts, any change in the legal framework will not have any effect 
and  there  will  not  be  a  great  difference  to  the  current  system.  The 
essence  is  that  the  influence  of  the  Chinese  authorities  on  the 
bankruptcy procedures needs to be reduced to zero in order to have an 
independent  bankruptcy  law  system.  An  independent  bankruptcy  law 
system will have a significant effect on the Chinese economy. The 2002 
draft  of  the  bankruptcy  law  still  contains  some  loopholes  that  might 
allow  the  authorities  to  influence  the  bankruptcy  procedures.  If  the 
judges are willing and able to implement the new regulation without any 
influence from the authorities, this law will offer good protection to all 
investors. Investors of intellectual property rights have many concerns 
regarding  the  legal  environment  and  prefer  an  environment  that  is 
calculable. Like any other investors, they are looking for the lowest risk. 
The  more  uncertainties  investors  see  in  a  country,  the  higher  the 
chance is that they will look elsewhere for their investment.  
After  the  new  bankruptcy  law  becomes  effective,  it  will  have  to  be 
analysed and strategies can be developed to face the new challenge.  123 
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